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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal under Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996) and 
Article VIII, §3 of the Constitution of the State of Utah. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. Did Judge Young commit reversible error by imputing income to Mr. Linnell 
for the purpose of calculating alimony and child support obligations? This 
Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge Young's decision for correctness, 
State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's 
factual error for abuse of discretion. David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 
971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This issue was preserved in the trial 
court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, 
and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree (Index No. 81), ffIB 2-6, 
16-19, IC 1-15. 
2. If Judge Young did not err when he imputed income to Mr. Linnell, did Judge 
Young commit reversible error in calculating the amount of income that he 
imputed to Mr. Linnell? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge 
Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 
1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. David 
K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This is-
sue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memorandum 
6 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree 
(Index No. 81), JJIB 2-6,16-19, IC 1-15. 
Did Judge Young commit reversible error in awarding the Appellee alimony of 
$1,100.00 per month? This Court reviews the legal issues raised by Judge 
Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 425 (Utah 
1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. David 
K. Mast v. Brent Oversow No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). This is-
sue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellants Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Divorce Decree 
(IndexNo.81),fIB28. 
Did Judge Young commit reversible error by awarding the parties' $380,000.00 
home to the Appellee rather than ordering the sale of the home so that the 
Court could make an equitable division of the marital property? This issue 
raises both issues of law and of fact. This Court reviews the legal issues raised 
by Judge Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,425 
(Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. 
David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Di-
7 
vorce Decree (Index No. 81), }IB 19. 
5. Did Judge Young commit reversible error by awarding a pproximately 
$312,440 of the marital assets to the Appellee while awarding approximately 
$191,919 of the assets to Mr. Linnell? This Court reviews the legal issues raised 
by Judge Young's decision for correctness, State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421,425 
(Utah 1991), and reviews Judge Young's factual error for abuse of discretion. 
David K. Mast v. Brent Overson, No. 971586-CA (Utah App. Dec. 31, 1998.). 
This issue was preserved in the trial court in Respondent/Appellant's Memo-
randum of Points and Authorities in Support of Objection to Proposed Find-
ings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Di-
vorce Decree (Index No. 81), JJIB 10-23, IC 1-15. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are attached in the Addendum: Utah Code §30-3-5(7)(a)38; 
Utah Code §78-2-2 (1996)5; Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (1998)31. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This appeal arises out of a divorce action presided over by District Court Judge 
David S. Young. The case resulted in a trial before Judge Young on December 17,18, 
and 21, 1998. On May 20, 1999, Judge Young entered his Findings of Fact, Conclu-
sions of Law and Decree of Divorce. Because Judge Young's findings were objec-
tionable, Mr. Linnell filed objections with the District Court, which Judge Young 
heard on April 16, 1999. Judge Young denied Mr. LinnelFs critical objections, how-
8 
ever. Court's Minutes Order (Index No. 121). Therefore, on June 28, 1999, Mr. Lin-
nell filed a motion to amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of 
Divorce, which Judge Young denied. Court's Minute Order (Index No. 228). Mr. 
Linnell then filed his notice of appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. The parties to this action were married for twenty-six years before the Appellee 
filed for divorce.1 During their marriage, they had seven children, five of whom 
were minors at the time of trial.2 Neither party has had formal education after 
high school. 
2. From approximately January 1981 to December 1995 Mr. Linnell worked for a 
lawn care company known as Lawnlife Corporation. Mr. Linnell's first job with 
Lawnlife was an entry level position of "lawn estimator" and "lawn technician." 
His duties included meeting with the public, giving quotes or bids regarding 
service, and actually applying lawn treatments.3 Because he demonstrated out-
standing qualities as an employee, Lawnlife's owners soon promoted Mr. Lin-
nell to the position of manager of the company.4 
3. At the time Lawnlife promoted Mr. Linnell, the company was in dismal finan-
1
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol I (Index No. 241), p. 18,1.21. 
2
 Id. at p. 19,11.9-16. 
3
 M a t p. 184,1.10—p. 185,1.23. 
4
 M a t p. 186,1.8—13. 
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cial condition.5 Mr. Linnell worked hard in his position as manager, and, de-
spite his lack of formal education, Lawnlife became quite prosperous under his 
management.6 
4. Although Mr. Linnell performed brilliantly as manager of Lawnlife, in Decem-
ber 1995 Mr. Linnell clashed with the principle shareholder of the company 
over management matters and over the amount of Mr. LinnelTs salary. Because 
of the conflict, Lawnlife terminated Mr. LinnelTs employment after fourteen 
years of faithful service—he was forced to leave the company. Mr. LinnelTs 
termination was involuntary on his part.7 Thus, three and one-half years be-
fore the Appellee filed for divorce in this action, Mr. Linnell found himself in-
voluntarily unemployed. 
5. For about two years after his involuntary termination from Lawnlife, Mr. Lin-
nell supported his family through consulting with lawn care companies.8 Dur-
5
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 186,1. 
14—p. 188,1.5. 
6 M at p. 68,1.19—p. 69,1.23. 
7
 Id. at p. 192, 11. 1 -11; p. 193,11. 21 -23. Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 
1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 220,11. 1 -24. The Appellee conceded at her deposi-
tion and at trial that Mr. LinnelTs employment with Lawnlife had been involuntarily 
terminated. Deposition Transcript of Carolyn Linnell, November 12, 1998 (Index 
No. 245), p. 39,11. 14-19; Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (In-
dex No. 241), p. 69,11. 21 -23. This fact was also conceded by Appellee's counsel at 
trial to prevent further cross examination on this issue. Id. at p. 71,11. 1-9. 
8
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18,1998 (Index No. 242), R220, U. 19-21. 
10 
ing that time, Mr. Linnell earned between $26,000 and $29,000 per year.9 In 
addition, for several years before the divorce, the Appellee's wealthy father, 
Harold Hammond, made gifts to her of approximately $20,000.00 per year.10 
6. However, even though the Appellee's father regularly made annual gifts to her 
of $20,000.00, Mr. Linnell was not satisfied with the family's finances. There-
fore, in late 1996, Mr. Linnell consulted with the Appellee regarding the possi-
bility of starting his own lawn care company with a friend.ll 
7. The Appellee initially did not want Mr. Linnell to start a new company. She was 
opposed to a new company because she knew that such a venture would re-
quire Mr. Linnell to work grueling hours—twelve to fourteen hour days, seven 
days a week.12 She was also opposed to the startup of a new company because if 
would mean that Mr. Linnell would make less money.13 
8. Nonetheless, after discussions about the venture, the Appellee decided to sup-
port Mr. Linnell in starting up his own lawn care company. The Appellee gave 
Mr. Linnell her approval and support even though she knew it would mean 
9
 Plaintiffs Exhibit No. 5; Defendants Exhibits Nos. 18 and 19. 
10
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 86,1. 
25—p. 89,1.8. 
11
 M a t p. 89,11. 15-18. 
12
 W. at p. 89,1. 19—p. 90,1. 10. 
13
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 91,11. 3 -
11. 
11 
that the couple would experience financial hardship in the beginning.14 Even 
though the couple had made the decision to found a lawn care company, how-
ever, Mr. Linnell did not have sufficient capital to start the venture. Therefore, 
after the Appellee approved Mr. LinnelFs plan, the Appellee's father loaned 
Mr. Linnell money to start the company.15 
9. After discussing the matter fully with the Appellee and after obtaining her 
blessing and her father's financial backing, Mr. Linnell started Green Pointe 
Lawncare, Inc. in January 1997,16 seven months before the Appellee filed for di-
vorce. Mr. Linnell owns 50% of the business, and his partner owns the remain-
ing 50%.17 Since he formed Green Pointe, Mr. Linnell has devoted his full time 
efforts to building the business and making it profitable. 
10. In a determined effort to make Green Pointe a success, Mr. Linnell has worked 
grueling hours. During the summer, he works from ten to sixteen hours a day 
during the week, and four to five hours a day on the weekend.18 During the 
winter, Mr. Linnell generally works ten hours each week day an d does some 
14
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 91,11. 12-
23. 
15
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 227,11. 8-
19. 
16
 Ma t p. 227,11.1-6. 
17
 M a t p. 227,11. 6-7. 
18
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 95,11. 15-
18. 
12 
work on the weekends. He has not taken more than a couple of days for vaca-
tion since the business was founded.19 Thus, Green Pointe has employed Mr. 
Linnell full time since January 1997. Yet in 1997, Green Pointe's business had 
not yet developed to the point that any revenues were available to pay Mr. Lin-
nell and his partner. Despite no cash disbursements to Mr. Linnell and his 
partner in 1997, Green Pointe nonetheless suffered a loss of $1,698.00 in 1997. 
Defendant's Exhibit II. In 1998, Green Pointe's business had improved to the 
point at which it was able to pay Mr. Linnell. Even though Green Point paid 
Mr. Linnell and his partner only $14,277.31 each in 1998, Green Pointe su f-
fered a loss of $1,146.38. Defendant's Exhibit 20. 
11. Notwithstanding Mr. LinnelTs extraordinary efforts to make Green Pointea 
success, and notwithstanding the admissions of the Appellee and her cou nsel 
that Mr. Linnell had been involuntarily terminated from Lawnlife, the Appellee 
nonetheless maintained that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed and 
that additional income should be imputed to him for the purpose of calculating 
Mr. LinnelTs child support and alimony obligations. In support of this asser-
tion, the Appellee offered as evidence only the testimony of her expert witness, 
Peter Woodward Philips, a professor of economics who purports to be a spe-
cialist of labor economics.20 The Appellee asked her labor economist to render 
Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 96,11. 9 -
19. 
20
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), pp. 112-143. 
13 
two opinions: 
a. "Given an individual with experience, skills and accomplishments in the 
lawn care industry here in Utah as an administrator of business, what 
would be the prospects of obtaining a similar occupation in and around 
Utah?" 
b. "Assuming that such a position as a chief administrative officer, prime su-
pervisor of such a lawn care company were attained, what would be the in-
come prospects of such an operation, were the job attained?"21 
12. The Appellee's labor economist performed no investigation before rendering 
an opinion regarding the first of the two questions. Rather, he made certain 
random "assumptions" upon which he performed a statistical analysis in order 
to answer the second of the two questions. He testified that "because I had two 
questions put before me, I used those assumptions primarily in asking and an-
swering the second of those.. .two questions."22 
13. The Appellee's 1 abor economist did not perform a field survey to determine 
whether there actually were supervisory lawn care jobs available in the Salt 
Lake City market.23 He did not perform such a survey because that "kind of re-
21
 M a t p. 115,11. 15-25. 
22
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 116,11.21-
24. 
23
 Id. at p. 134,11.22-25. 
14 
search, particularly the sort of research that you're suggesting, would be rela-
tively expensive. It will require field interviews on my part and fairly time con-
suming."24 Indeed, the Appellee's labor economist did nothing other "than 
looking in the yellow pages...."25 He made no other attempt to even identify 
what other lawn care companies operate in Utah. He did not investigate which 
Utah lawn care companies actually employ managers.26 He did not know how 
many of the companies were owner operated.27 He did not know how many of 
the companies were large enough to afford a manager.28 He did no investiga-
tion to see if any Utah lawn care company had any available managerial posi-
tions.29 In short, rather than perform an investigation into whether Mr. Linnell 
could really expect to get a managerial job in the lawn care industry, the Appel-
lee's labor economist relied on government statistical data published by the 
Utah State Labor Market Information Service to perform a statistical analysis 
of the lawn care industry in general, and rendered an opinion that the "lawn 
24
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 134,1. 
22—p.135,1.9. 
25 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 135,11. 
17-22. 
26
 M a t p. 136,11.2-5. 
27
 Id. at p. 136,11.6-7. 
Id. at p. 136,11.8-10. 28 
29
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 135,1. 
1—p.136,1.22. 
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and garden care business is a very rapidly growing segment of the Utah labor 
market."30 Based on that brilliant ivory tower analysis, he then opined that "an 
individual with experience and qualifications for being a manager or adminis-
trator of a lawn care business would have good prospects, or at least reason-
able prospects, of finding such an occupation over a reasonable period of time. 
Say perhaps two years of job search."31 (emphasis added). Thus, the Appellee's 
own expert labor economist opined that it could take two years for Mr. Linnell 
to find employment in a managerial position in the lawn care industry. Regard-
ing the likelihood that a similarly situated person could obtain such employ-
ment in one or two months, the Appellee's expert testified that "they're sub-
stantially less likely to come to successful fruition."32 
14. Assuming that Mr. Linnell could find such employment, the Appellee's labor 
economist opined that Mr. Linnell would make approximately $41,000.00 per 
year based on a normal work week.33 The Appellee offered no other evidence 
regarding the employability of Mr. Linnell or of his possible salary if he were 
successful in finding employment. Moreover, the Appellee's labor economist 
testified that the lawn care business was one of the best industries in Utah to 
30
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 119,1. 
8—p. 121,1.23. 
31
 Id. at p. 122,11.3-9. 
32
 M a t p. 135,11.10-16. 
33Mat p. 129,11.23-25. 
16 
start a new company.34 Thus, based on the Appellee's own expert's testimony, 
Mr. LinnelTs highest and best use would be to start his own lawn care com-
pany. 
15. Unlike the Appellee's economist, Mr. LinnelTs employment expert looked to 
see what jobs were actually available for someone with Mr. LinnelTs qualifica-
tions before she rendered an opinion regarding his employability. Defendant's 
Exhibit 31. Dr. Kristy Farnsworth testified, for example, that the Utah Depart-
ment of Workforce Services listed no jobs in landscape supervision for some-
one with Mr. LinnelTs qualifications.3" Based on actual Utah job availability 
data, she opined that if Mr. Linnell were required to stop working for Green 
Pointe and get another job, ahe probably would most likely be able to become 
employed as an account representative, sales associate or management trainee, 
and that the starting salary would range probably somewhere between $24,800 
up to $30,300."36 
16. During the course of the trial, Mr. Linnell introduced evidence and asserted 
that his "highest and best use" was in operating Green Pointe.37 In response to 
Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 133,1. 
12—p. 134,1.6. 
35
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 337,11. 3-
9. 
36
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 340,11. 
15-20. 
37Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. I (Index No. 241), p. 189,11. 19-
17 
such evidence and assertions, Judge Young stated that: "I don't think there's 
any dispute that he's in his highest and best employment."38 Regarding Mr. 
LinnelTs work at Green Pointe, the following exchange took place during trial: 
THE COURT: I don't think Mr. Christensen is arguing that he ought 
to seek another job. I don't think that's the argument; is it, Mr. Chris-
tensen? 
MR. CHRISTENSEN: No, the argument is determining what his earn-
ings are for purposes of child support and alimony, and it's what's to 
be imputed to him. Not that he take another job. 
THE COURT: Right. That's what I understand.39 
17. Thus, the Appellee does not dispute, and has not disputed, that Mr. LinnelTs 
highest and best use is to continue his present employment with Green Pointe. 
Moreover, Judge Young clearly understood during trial that there was no dis-
pute that Mr. Linnell was in his "highest and best employment," and that the 
Appellee did not assert that Mr. Linnell should take another job. 
18. Nonetheless, Judge Young went on to make Findings of Fact that are inconsis-
tent with the record. First, Judge Young entered Finding No. 11, which states: 
"Respondent, himself, has acknowledged his ability to earn $35,000.00 per 
year." Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 4, f 11. 
There is no evidence whatsoever in the record to support this finding. This 
20. 
38
 Ma t p. 189,11.23-24. 
39
 Id at p. 190,11. 13-20; Defendant's Exhibit 31. 
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matter was addressed and argued at a hearing regarding Mr. LinnelTs objec-
tions to the Appellee's proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.40 In 
overruling Mr. LinnelTs objection that there is no evidence in the record that 
he acknowledged that he could earn $35,000.00 per year, the following ex-
change took place, which succinctly illustrates the tone of this litigation: 
THE COURT: I don't think he's going to find his earnings are going to 
be much off of that when the business gets settled and gets going. You 
know, they're [Hal Christensen and his client are] entitled to prepare 
their findings and their decree, and if we have 13 to 15, 14 pages of 
this, we have to labor through these kinds of objections, I don't see 
that in the future there would be any disadvantage if there were a 
modification filed to have a finding in there that says, "He's acknowl-
edged he can earn $35,000 a year." If experience shows that he 
doesn't, then I have to deal with that experience. If experience shows 
he earns $50,000 a year, then I have to deal with that experience. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: That's fine. Then let's have the language say that 
experience shows that. My problem is— 
THE COURT: I'm not going to—he's [Hal Christensen's] entitled to 
write it with the adjectives he wants to choose, and I don't think we 
ought to be laboring—I want to deal with substantive matters. If you 
think there's an inaccuracy in the evidence, then let's deal with that. 
MR. STEFFENSEN: I do, because my client never said that. 
THE COURT: Okay. Well, the objection is overruled.41 
19. At no time during the preceding exchange did Judge Young explain his theory 
that a trial court should make a finding of fact simply because a prevailing 
party drafts the proposed finding to include self-serving statements that are en-
Transcript of April 16,1999 Hearing (Index No. 244), p. 9,1. 17—p. 11,1. 19. 
41
 Transcript of April 16, 1999 Hearing (Index No. 244), p. 10,1. 19—p. 11,1. 19. 
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tirely without evidentiary basis. 
20. Judge Young went on to find that an individual such as Mr. Linnell should be 
able to make between $30,000.00 and $50,000.00 per year, and that Mr. Linnell 
was voluntarily underemployed because Green Pointe should use its available 
capital to pay Mr. Linnell rather than to pay Green Pointe's operating expenses 
or debts.42 Judge Young then imputed income to Mr. Linnell of $40,000.00, or 
$3,333.33 per month.43 Judge Young made this finding despite the agreement 
of all concerned that Mr. LinnelTs employment with Green Pointe was hi s 
highest and best use. 
21. Because Judge Young supported his imputation of income to Mr. Linnell on 
the ground that Green Pointe supposedly had cash assets of $38,246.10 that it 
could distribute to its owners,44 Mr. Linnell objected to the Appellee's proposed 
finding of fact 12 on the following grounds:45 
a. Judge Young erred in determining the actual amount of Green Pointe's 
cash assets;46 
42
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,127) p. 4, Jf 10-12. 
43
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,127-128), p. 4, 513. 
44
 Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of law, and Decree of Divorce (Index No. 189), p. 2, J 5. 
45
 Id. at p. 2-3, J5. 
46
 Defendant's Exhibit D-20, 1998 Profit and Loss Statement of Green Pointe. De-
fendant's Exhibit D-21, Green Pointe Balance Sheet. Transcript of Bench Trial, De-
cember 18,1999, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 229,1. 14—p. 238,1. 1. 
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b. the amount of "cash on hand" reflected Green Pointe's uncollected ac-
counts receivable even though Green Pointe might not be able to collect 
on those accounts;47 
c. Mr. LinnelTs undisputed testimony and the undisputed testimony of his 
accounting expert witness was that the cash was not available for distribu-
tion because Green Pointe needed the cash to pay its ongoing operating 
expenses;48 and 
d. Utah law prohibited the distribution of Green Pointers cash assets to its 
shareholders because it would render the corporation insolvent. 
22. According to Mr. LinnelTs expert accountant, Green Pointe's Profit and Loss 
Statement for 1998 and Balance Sheet demonstrated that Green Point had no 
value based on the two most common methods of valuing a business. From the 
"income approach" of business valuation, Green Pointe had no value because 
"the business is showing a loss from operations, and showed a loss for the prior 
47
 Defendant's Exhibit D-20, 1998 Profit and Loss Statement of Green Pointe. De-
fendant's Exhibit D-21, Green Pointe Balance Sheet. Transcript of Bench Trial, De-
cember 18, 1999, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 229,1. 14—p. 238,1. 1. 
48
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 237,1. 
23—-p. 238,1. 1.; p. 296,1. 10—p. 297,1. 4. Mr. Linnell further asserted that the cash 
was not available for distribution under Utah Code §16-10a-640(3), which prohibits 
distributions to shareholders where the distribution would cause the corporation to 
be unable to pay its debts or to cause the corporation's total assets to be less than its 
liabilities. Memorandum in Support of Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, Index No. 189, p.9. 
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fiscal year also."49 From a "net book value" a pproach to valuation, Green 
Pointe had no value because "the equity in the balance sheet shows a negative 
. . »50 
equity. 
23. The Court imputed income to the Appellee at minimum wage, to bring her in-
come to $1,241.67 per month.51 
24. Based on the imputed incomes of both the parties, Judge Young ordered Mr. 
Linnell to make child support payments of $1,069.00 per month. Fin dings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124,136), p. 13, f 43. 
25. Judge Young found that the Appellee's reasonable monthly expenses were 
$2,486. Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124, 135), p. 12, 
f43. 
26. In calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony obligations, it is illustrative to use the fol-
lowing formula, which is commonly employed by the divorce commissioners 
and judges in the Third District Court: (Appellee's monthly expenses - Mr. 
LinnelTs monthly child support payment) - the Appellee's income = Mr. Lin-
nelTs monthly alimony payment. Using this formula, the Appellee's monthly 
expense of $2,486 less Mr. LinnelTs child support obligation of $1,069 per 
month equals $1,417. After subtracting the Appellee's monthly imputed in-
49
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index No. 242), p. 296,11. 
12-13. 
50
 M a t p. 296,1. 10—p. 297,1.4. 
51
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 12, f 17. 
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come of $1,241.67 from the $1,417 number, the remainder is $175.33. There-
fore, even using Judge Youngs own findings of fact, which are clearly erroneous, 
Mr. LinnelVs monthly alimony obligation should not he more than $17533 per 
month. Nonetheless, Judge Young ordered Mr. Linnell to make alimony pay-
ments of $1,100 per month for a period not to exceed twenty-six years. In ef-
fect, Judge Young imputed income to the Appellee for the purpose of calculat-
ing Mr. Linnell's child support payments, but did not impute income to the 
Appellee for the purpose of calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony payments. 
27. Regarding the division of the marital property, Judge Young awarded the Ap-
pellee $312,440 of the parties' $504,359 in marital assets (including their house, 
which was valued at $380,000), and awarded Mr. Linnell only $191,919.52 Judge 
Young made no factual finding that supports this grossly unequal division of 
marital property. 
28. At trial, Mr. Linnell asserted that the Court should order the sale of the parties' 
major asset, their house, so that the Court could then fairly divide the equity in 
the home in a manner that would substantially equalize the parties' assets and 
standard of living. The Court valued the home at $380,000, and he found that 
the parties had net equity in the home of $321,147.53 
52
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124), p. 6, ff 19-40; Respon-
dent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Divorce Decree (Index No. 189) (Summary of Asset Division). 
53
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 8, 530. 
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29. In support of his assertion that the house should be sold, Mr. Linnell intr o-
duced unrebutted testimony, through his real estate expert, that there were 
many suitable alternative homes in the immediate neighborhood on the mar-
ket at significantly less than the value of the house. Mr. LinnelPs real estate ex-
pert testified regarding comparable homes that were within the same elemen-
tary school area as the school that the parties' children attend, Upland Terrace. 
In the Upland Terrace area, there were twenty-one homes for sale, with an av-
erage asking price of $202,900.54 In fact, most of the homes were under the 
$200,000 price range.55 During the prior year, seventy-six homes had sold in 
the area and the average sales price was $189,334.56 When Mr. Linnell at-
tempted to introduce detail regarding less expensive alternative housing in the 
immediate area, the Court sustained the Appellee's objection on the grounds of 
relevance, and would not permit such testimony/7 
30. Ultimately, Judge Young declined to order the sale of the house so that the eq-
uity could be utilized to equalize the standard of living of the parties. Instead, 
Judge Young found, without any evidence in the record to support the finding, 
that it was in the best interests of the children that the Appellee be awarded the 
54
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998, Vol. II (Index 242), p. 279,1. 2 —p. 
280,1.11. 
55
 Id. at p. 280,1.14. 
56
 Id. at p. 282,11. 7-14. 
57
 Id. at 285,1.23-p. 287,1.10. 
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family home.58 Judge Young did order the Appellee to refinance the home, and 
to pay to Mr. Linnell $100,000 so that Mr. Linnell could have less than one 
third of the $321,147 that the parties had in the house. 
31. Meanwhile, because of the Court's orders, Mr. Linnell has been reduced to liv-
ing in poverty, staying in an attic bedroom he rents from the owner of a con-
dominium. There are no facilities in Mr. Linnell's "Ann Frank" style room for 
the children to stay in when they come to visit him.59 In short, visitation rights 
of more than a few hours in a day are effectively impossible. 
32. Thus, Judge Young's refusal to order the sale of the house and to divide the eq-
uity equally between the parties disregards the undisputed evidence established 
at trial that the parties cannot afford to allow Mr. Linnell an acceptable stan-
dard of living if the Appellee is allowed to keep the $380,000 home. The undis-
puted testimony at trial was that the alimony and child support obligations, 
when combined with Judge Young's grossly inequitable property division, 
would result in severe financial distress to Mr. Linnell that far outweighs any 
desire to keep the children in the current home when less expensive suitable al-
ternatives are available. 
33. Regarding the parties' cash assets, Judge Young found that as of October 1994 
(over four years before trial, and three years before the Appellee filed for d i-
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 9, J33. 
59
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17, 1998, Vol. 1 (Index No. 241), p. 197,1. 
8—p. 201,1.11. 
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vorce) the parties had approximately $60,000.00 in cash.60 The District Court 
also found that the Appellee had taken most of the family cash by transferring 
$40,000.00 of the cash to her own certificate of deposit accounts, leaving 
$20,000.00 in the parties5 joint account, which Mr. Linnell then deposited in a 
separate account of their own.61 Judge Young then valued the marital cash as-
sets as of October 1994, and ordered the Appellee to pay $10,000 to Mr. Linnell 
to "equalize" the division of the parties' cash assets.62 The evidence in there-
cord indicates that Judge Young should have valued the marital cash assets as 
of the time of trial, rather than at a time three years before the Appellee even 
filed for divorce, for the following reasons: 
a. Although the Appellee testified that she took the family cash because she 
was contemplating a divorce in October 1994, she did not actually file for 
divorce until July 31,1997, nearly three years later; 
b. After the Appellee took most of the family cash, she used a small amount 
of it for minor purchases, such as the purchase of family food and auto-
mobile fuel, thus expending only small portions of those cash on the fam-
' Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 6, 520. 
Id. at p. 6, 520. 
lId. at p. 7, 522. 
1
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 17,1998 Vol. I (Index 241), p. 78,11. 15-20. 
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c. Mr. Linnell, however, used the remaining $20,000 of the family's cash to 
pay much of the family's expenses for a period of three years;64 
d. At the time of trial, the Appellee had almost $57,000 of the marital cash in 
two certificate of deposit accounts ($22,155.13 plus $34,860.98) that was 
marital property, whereas Mr. Linnell had only $7,000 left in cash ($1,322 
in his money market account and $5,708.27 in his America First Credit 
Union checking account).65 
34. There is no evidence in the record that would justify dividing the cash based on 
the balance as of October 1994 instead of valuing the cash asset based on the 
balance at the time of trial. 
35. Judge Young's award of most of the equity in the parties' house to the Appellee, 
along with most of the parties' cash assets, results in an overall property divi-
sion that is grossly unfair to Mr. Linnell. The result is a division of the marital 
estate that awards approximately $191,919.00 of the total value of $312,440 to 
the Appellee.66 Thus, Judge Young made no effort to "equalize" the division of 




 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Index No. 124), p. 6, 521; p. 7, 5524-25; 
p. 8, 526. 
66
 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, (Index No. 124), p. 6, 5519-40; Respon-
dent's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Divorce Decree (Index No. 189) (Summary of Asset Division). 
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for both parties. 
36. In making the grossly inequitable division of the marital estate, Judge Young 
speculated about the possible growth in the business volume of Green Pointe. 
Judge Young found that Green Pointe "will continue to grow in the future," 
and he relied on this nebulous speculation about the future growth of the 
Green Pointe in dividing the marital assets. Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law (Index No. 124), p. 10, 540. 
37. Judge Young valued Green Pointe as part of the marital estate, and found that 
the parties' 50% interest in the company was worth $35,800. The District Court 
awarded this 50% interest to Mr. Linnell.67 In reaching this valuation, Judge 
Young necessarily included the value of Green Pointe's cash assets in the over-
all value of the company. However, as discussed above, Judge Young also im-
puted income to Mr. Linnell on the grounds that the company purportedly had 
cash assets available for distribution to Mr. Linnell. If Green Pointe distributes 
part of its cash assets to Mr. Linnell in salary, then the net worth and future 
growth of the company is adversely impacted. Either the cash is available for 
distribution to Mr. Linnell, or the company keeps its cash. But the cash assets 
cannot be used for both purposes—to do so is to inequitably inflate the value 
of Mr. Linnell's award of the parties' interest in Green Pointe or to inequitably 
inflate the income imputed to him. In short, either the company uses the cash 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law(Index No. 124), p. 10, 540. 
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for its operating expenses, or it distributes the cash to Mr. Linnell. But it cannot 
do both. 
38. Ultimately, the evidence in this action reveals that Judge Young has committed 
reversible error in calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony and child support obliga-
tions. Moreover, the evidence proves that Judge Young's division of the marital 
assets between the parties has resulted in great and unjust hardship to Mr. Lin-
nell. 
39. Judge Young's treatment of Mr. Linnell in this case is not only inequitable, 
however. His treatment of Mr. Linnell is irrational. Judge Young himself prac-
tically invited this Court's reversal of his rulings during the final day of trial. In 
response to Mr. LinnelPs argument that the Court's rulings are unworkable, 
Judge Young stated: "Well, I'd like to make a rational order, but it sounds to 
me like I'm going to make an irrational order no matter what I do."68 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The evidence in this case proves that Mr. Linnell was employed by Green Pointe in 
his highest and best use, and that Mr. Linnell has worked hard to provide for his 
family. Under Utah law, a District Court can only impute income to a person who is 
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing child sup-
port or alimony obligations. Because Mr. Linnell was not voluntarily unemployed or 
underemployed, and because Judge Young did not make findings sufficient to i m-
68
 Transcript of Bench Trial, December 21, 1998, Vol. Ill (Index No. 243), p. 456, U. 
14-16. 
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pute income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell was 
clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 
Moreover, even if the evidence supported the imputation of income to Mr. 
Linnell, which it does not, the record does not contain evidence sufficient to support 
Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell in the annual amount of 
$40,000.00. Moreover, Judge Young did not make findings sufficient to impu te an 
annual income of $40,000.00 to Mr. Linnell. Therefore, Judge Young's imputation of 
income to Mr. Linnell was clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 
In making an alimony award, the District Court must consider the mandatory 
three Jones factors: 1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 2) 
the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient income for him or herself; 
and 3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support. In ordering Mr. Lin-
nell to pay $1,100.00 per month in alimony to the Appellee, Judge Young either 
made mathematical errors or failed to consider the second and third of these factors. 
Moreover, Judge Young failed to enter findings of fact sufficiently detailed to sup-
port the alimony award. Therefore, the alimony award is clearly erroneous and an 
abuse of discretion. 
Because the parties' primary marital asset was the equity in their house, Judge 
Young should have ordered the sale of the house and the equal division of the equity 
between the parties. The evidence indicates that there were numerous suitable, yet 
far less expensive, houses in the immediate neighborhood that the Appellee could 
have purchased with her share of the proceeds of a sale of the house, with little re-
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suiting disruption for the children. The District Court's refusal to order the sale of 
the parties' major asset so that the marital estate could be divided equally, as well the 
Court's failure to enter sufficiently detailed findings of fact supporting its decision 
was clearly erroneous and constitute an abuse of discretion 
Judge Young's resulting division of the marital estate awards approximately 
$312,440.00 of the total value of $504,359.00 to the Appellee. Judge Young made no 
effort to "equalize" the division of the marital assets so that there was an equalization 
of the standard of living of the parties. Nor did he enter findings that detail the basis 
for his deviation of the general rule that favors an equal division of the marital estate. 
Therefore, Judge Young's division of the marital estate was clearly erroneous and 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
ARGUMENT 
1. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell for the purpose of calculat-
ing alimony and child support obligations was clearly erroneous and an abuse of 
discretion. 
1.1. Under Utah law, the District Court can only impute income to a person who 
is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing 
child support or alimony obligations. 
Under Utah law, a District Court can impute income to a parent for the purpose of 
calculating child support obligations if it makes a finding that the parent is voluntar-
ily unemployed or underemployed. Utah Code §78-45-7.5 (1998). The District 
Court can also impute income to a spouse under such circumstances when calculat-
ing alimony obligations. Hill v. Hill, 869 P.2d 963, 965 (Utah App. 1994). "However, 
the goal of imputing income is to prevent parents from reducing their child support 
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or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." Id. It follows that 
the Court cannot impute income if a person is not voluntarily unemployed or un-
deremployed. Nor can the Court impute income if a person is underemployed for 
reasons other than attempting to reduce child support or alimony obligations. 
1.2. The District Court's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell is clearly erroneous 
and an abuse of discretion because Mr. Linnell is not voluntarily unem-
ployed or underemployed for the purpose of reducing his child support or 
alimony obligations. 
In the case at bar, the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Linnell is employed by Green 
Pointe, and that he works extremely hard to provide for his family. Because he is 
currently employed on a full time basis, Judge Young could not impute income to 
Mr. Linnell on the grounds that he was unemployed. Therefore, in order to impute 
income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young would have to find that Mr. Linnell was volun-
tarily underemployed. The evidence, however, clearly establishes that Mr. Linnell is 
not voluntarily underemployed. 
Rather, the evidence establishes that despite his stellar success as the manager 
of Lawnlife, Mr. Linnell was involuntarily terminated from that position se veral 
years before the Appellee filed for divorce. Thus, Mr. LinnelTs subsequent attempts 
to provide for his family in the lawn care industry do not constitute "voluntary" un-
deremployment. In the years following the loss of his position with Lawnlife, Mr. 
Linnell provided for his family by consulting in the only business he knows—the 
lawn care industry. Moreover, when he found that he was not making enough 
money consulting, he started Green Pointe with the hope of repeating his com-
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mendable performance at Lawnlife. 
The self-serving opinion of the Appellee's labor economist is the only evidence 
in the record that suggests that Mr. Linnell could find a position in the lawn care in-
dustry that is more lucrative than his position at Green Pointe. However, the Appel-
lee's labor economist opined that it could take two years for Mr. Linnell to find an-
other managerial position with a lawn care company. Moreover, the Appellee's labor 
economist testified that he had not conducted field research to support his opinions, 
and that he knew of no managerial jobs available with Utah lawn care companies. 
Rather, the economist's opinion was based on an ivory tower statistical analysis of 
government statistics. 
In addition, Mr. Linnell's labor expert fully rebutted the testimony of the Ap-
pellee's labor economist. Mr. Linnell's expert testified that her investigation revealed 
that there were no openings for managerial positions with Utah lawn care compa-
nies. She also testified that a person with Mr. Linnell's high school education and 
qualifications would make a salary of between $24,000 and $30,000 in the jobs avail-
able in the Utah market. 
Moreover, there is abundant evidence in the record that Mr. Linnell is not un-
deremployed at all. Before he founded Green Pointe, Mr. Linnell discussed the ven-
ture in depth with the Appellee and sought her blessing. The Appellee was initially 
reticent, knowing that Mr. Linnell would have to work long grueling hours, and that 
in the early years Mr. Linnell would not make much money. Nonetheless, the Appel-
lee eventually approved the Green Pointe venture. There is simply no evidence 
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whatsoever that Mr. Linnell founded Green Pointe so that he could reduce child 
support or alimony payments. Rather, he relied on the Appellee's blessing, approval, 
and support in founding Green Pointe, and he has committed himself to making the 
venture a success. 
The Appellee's assertion that Mr. Linnell is underemployed is especially i n-
credible in light of statements made on the record by both counsel for the Appellee 
and Judge Young. The Appellee's attorney specifically represented to the Court that 
the Appellee does not assert that Mr. Linnell should quit his job at Green Pointe and 
get another job elsewhere. In addition, Judge Young clarified that neither the Dis-
trict Court nor the Appellee were advocating that Mr. Linnell should get another 
job. Obviously, if income greater than Mr. Linnell's salary were imputed to him, 
then he would be forced to abandon Green Pointe to get another job in order to pay 
the resulting increased child support and alimony obligations. If Mr. Linnell were 
truly underemployed at Green Pointe, then his salary would necessarily be inade-
quate to pay the child support and alimony obligations required of him under Judge 
Young's income imputation. The remarks of counsel and of the Court indicate that 
not even they believe that Mr. Linnell is underemployed in his position at Green 
Pointe. 
Thus, the undisputed evidence is that Mr. Linnell had only good intentions in 
starting Green Pointe and that he has worked incredibly hard to make the venture a 
success. There is no evidence that he started the company for the purpose of reduc-
ing child support or alimony payments. Moreover, Mr. Linnell could reasonably ex-
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pect to make only $24,000 to $30,000 if he left his employment at Green Pointe and 
sought another job in the Utah market. 
In summary, Judge Young's finding that Mr. Linnell is voluntarily underem-
ployed and that income is to be imputed to him is against the clear weight of the evi-
dence, and a review of the evidence suggests that the District Court has made a 
grievous mistake. Given the evidence, it was clearly erroneous for Judge Young to 
find that Mr. Linnell was voluntarily underemployed, and it was clearly erroneous to 
impute income to Mr. Linnell that is greater than Mr. LinnelTs actual salary at Green 
Pointe. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should reverse Judge Young's ruling. See 
e.g. Cummings. v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,476 (Utah App. 1991). 
2. Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell in the amount of $40,000,00 
is dearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. 
There is no substantive evidence in the record that supports Judge Young's decision 
to use the $40,000.00 per annum figure in imputing income to Mr. Linnell. In fact, 
the only basis in the record for such an imputation is the opinion of the Appellee's 
labor economist, who opined that Mr. Linnell might be able to find a job in the lawn 
care industry with an annual income of $41,000.00 after a search of up to two years. 
The Appellee's economist performed no actual survey of the Utah job market to de-
termine whether such jobs were available, however. Instead, the economist relied 
solely on an ivory tower statistical analysis of government statistics about Utah firms 
in general. There is simply no hard evidence in the record that indicates that there 
was a job in the Utah market that would pay a person of Mr. Linnell's qualifications 
an annual salary of $40,000.00. 
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Furthermore, Mr. LinnelFs labor expert rebutted the testimony of the Appel-
lee's labor economist by testifying that her investigation of the Utah job market did 
not reveal an available managerial position with a lawn care company. She testified 
that someone with Mr. LinnelTs skills and experience could reasonably expect to 
find a job with an annual income of between $24,000 and $30,000. 
Perhaps because the record contains no substantive evidence that supports 
Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell, Judge Young did not make spe-
cific findings of fact supporting his imputation. At the very least, Judge Young was 
required to include in his finding enough detail to reveal his reasoning process, and 
his finding should have been more than a cursory statement that Mr. Linnell is vol-
untarily underemployed, is capable of earning more money, and that a $40,000.00 
annual income is imputed to him. See Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 45, 46 (Utah App. 1999); see also, Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 
1997); Rehn v. Rehn, 974 P.2d 306, 310, 312 (Utah App. 1999). 
In other words, Judge Young's findings should have articulated the basis for his 
conclusion imputing $40,000.00 income to Mr. Linnell by showing the steps by 
which the Court reached its ultimate conclusion. Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234,1242 
(Utah 1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 
1338 (Utah 1979). Although trial courts have broad discretion in divorce actions, 
they must exercise their discretion "within the legal parameters set by appellate 
courts." Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,474-75 (Utah App. 1991). "[T]o en-
sure that the court acted within its broad discretion, the facts and reasons for the 
36 
court's decision must be set forth fully in appropriate findings and conclusions." 
Barnes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Judge Young's Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law fail to satisfy the requirements that the Court of Ap-
peals has repeatedly articulated. 
Given the lack of substantive evidence in the record that would support Judge 
Young's imputation of an annual income of $40,000.00 to Mr. Linnell, the imputa-
tion is so lacking in support as to be against the clear weight of the evidence, and 
constitutes reversible error. Young v. Young, 979 P.2d 338,342 (Utah 1999). 
3- Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation constitutes an 
abuse of discretion and is clearly erroneous. 
3.1. Judge Young's finding regarding alimony is deficient as a matter of law. 
Judge Young's finding of fact regarding alimony states: 
46. Petitioner should be awarded $1,100,00 per month permanent 
alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the marriage or until 
terminated by operation of law. Based upon Petitioner's imputed in-
come, Respondent's imputed income and both Petitioner's and Re-
spondent's reasonable expenses, alimony of $1,100 per month is a rea-
sonable amount. 
At the very least, Judge Young's conclusory finding that Mr. Linnell is required pay 
to the Appellee $1,100.00 per month alimony fails to include enough detail to reveal 
the District Court's reasoning process in arriving at its conclusion. Judge Young's 
finding should have been more than a cursory statement that Mr. Linnell is required 
to pay alimony. The finding should have included a description of the values Judge 
Young attributed to each of the items purportedly considered in a rriving at the 
$1,100 per month figure. In addition, Judge Young's finding should have provided a 
step by step analysis of the reasoning which lead him to his conclusion so that the 
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parties and the Court of Appeals can determine whether the finding is clearly erro-
neous or an abuse of discretion. Williamson v. Williamson, 372 Utah Adv. Rep. 45, 
46 (Utah App. 1999); Willey v. Willey, 951 P.2d 226, 230 (Utah 1997); Rehn v. Rehn, 
974 P.2d 306, 310, 312 (Utah App. 1999). Jeffs v. Stubbs, 970 P.2d 1234, 1242 (Utah 
1998), cert denied, 119 S. Ct. 1803 (1999); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,1338 
(Utah 1979); Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472,474-75 (Utah App. 1991); Bar-
nes v. Barnes, 857 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah App. 1993). Because Judge Young's finding 
regarding alimony fails to satisfy the requirements established by the appellate 
courts, his finding is in error and this case should be remanded to the District Court 
for an evidentiary hearing and more detailed findings of fact by the District Court. 
3.2. Judge Young's calculation of Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation is clearly erro-
neous and an abuse of discretion because Judge Young failed to consider: a) the 
Appellee's ability to produce income for herself, and b) Mr. Linnell's ability to 
provide the support. 
Under Utah law, Judge Young was required to make sufficiently detailed findings of 
fact showing that he considered the following three mandatory Jones factors in de-
termining Mr. Linnell's alimony obligation: 1) the financial conditions and needs of 
the receiving spouse; 2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce a sufficient in-
come for him or herself; and 3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide sup-
port. Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1985); Schindler v. Schindler, 776 P.2d 84, 
90 (Utah App. 1989); Utah Code §30-3-5(7)(a). Although Judge Young did make 
findings regarding the first factor, he failed to make findings demonstrating that he 
considered the second and third factors. Indeed, the record indicates that Judge 
Young must have willfully ignored the second and third factors, or at least made a 
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mathematical mistake. 
Judge Young's own findings demonstrate that the alimony award is clearly er-
roneous or an abuse of discretion. As to the first factor, Judge Young found that the 
Appellee had monthly living expenses of $2,486. Mr. L innelTs monthly child sup-
port payment of $1,069 should be subtracted from $2,486 because the Appellee can 
use the child support payment to meet the family's expenses. The resulting differ-
ence, which represents the Appellee's unpaid expenses, is $1,417. Because the Court 
must consider the Appellee's ability to produce income, the Appellee's monthly im-
puted income of $1,241.67 should be subtracted from the remaining expenses of 
$1,417, resulting in a difference of $175.33, which should be Mr. Li nnell's alimony 
obligation. To arrive at the $1,100 alimony award, Judge Young either made a 
mathematical error, or he failed to consider the Appellee's imputed income, which 
the Court was required to consider in connection with the second factor mentioned 
above. 
In addition, the third factor Judge Young was required to consider is Mr. Lin-
nell's ability to provide the support. Judge Young should have considered Mr. Lin-
nell's "needs and expenditures, such as housing, payment of debts, and other living 
expenses." Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 547 (Utah App. 1993). Judge Young found 
that Mr. Linnell's "reasonable" monthly expenses total $949. When Mr. L innelTs 
monthly expenses are added to his child support obligation of $1,069 and the ali-
mony obligation of $1,100 are added together, Mr. Linnell's total monthly outlay is 
$3,118, which is more than Mr. Linnell's gross monthly salary at Green Pointe, and 
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nearly all of the gross monthly salary of $3,333.33 that Judge Young imputed to him. 
Thus, in calculating Mr. LinnelTs alimony obligation, Judge Young either made a 
mathematical mistake, or he failed to consider Mr. Linnell's ability to provide the 
support. 
Judge Young's failure to consider two of the three factors that he must consider 
is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, as the Supreme Court of 
Utah has held, "An alimony award should, as far as possible, equalize the parties1 re-
spective standards of living and maintain them at a level as close as possible to the 
standard of living enjoyed during the marriage." Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564, 566 
(Utah 1985). The alimony award to the Appellee does not even come close to equal-
izing the parties' standards of living. Rather, it condemns Mr. Linnell to live in pov-
erty while the Appellee lives in a $380,000.00 home, with her e xpenses paid by Mr. 
Linnell. 
Therefore, Judge Young's award of alimony to the Appellee is reversible error. 
4. Judge Young's award of the parties' house to the Appellee was an abuse of di s-
cretion and was clearly erroneous. 
Under Utah law, the District Court must distribute the marital property in a fair, 
systematic fashion. Hall v. Hall, 858 P.2d, 1018, 1022 (Utah App. 1993). This Court 
has held that each party is presumed to be entitled to fifty percent of the marital 
property. Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1172 & n. 10 (Utah App. 1990), Hall v. Hall at 
1022. The Court can order the sale of the marital house in order to distribute the 
parties' equity to the parties on this fifty/fifty basis. Baker v. Baker, 866 P.2d 540, 544 
(Utah App. 1993). An unequal division of marital property, however, is only justi-
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fied when the trial court memorializes "in comniendably detailed findings" the ex-
ceptionai circumstances supporting the unequal distribution. Thomas v. Thomas, 
375 Utah Adv. Rep. 23,25 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). 
Because the parties' primary marital asset was the equity in their house, Mr. 
Lirmell asserted that it was necessary to sell the house in order to equally and equita-
bly divide the equity between the parties. The testimony of Mr. Linnell's real estate 
expert is the only evidence in the record regarding the impact a sale of the parties' 
house would have on the minor children. The real estate expert testified that there 
were numerous suitable, yet far less expensive, houses in the immediate neighbor-
hood that the Appellee could purchase. Mr. Linnell's real estate expert testified re-
garding comparable homes that were within the same elementary school area as Up-
land Terrace, the school that the parties' children attend. In the U pland Terrace 
area, the evidence at trial was that there were twenty-one homes for sale, with an av-
erage asking price of $202,900. In fact, most of the homes were under the $200,000 
price range. During the prior year alone, seventy-six homes had sold in the area and 
the average sales price was $189,334. When Mr. Linnell attempted to introduce de-
tail regarding less expensive alternative housing in the immediate area, however, the 
Court sustained the Appellee's objection on the grounds of relevance, and would 
not permit such testimony.69 
Based on this evidence, Judge Young made the following finding: 
Transcript of Bench Trial, December 18, 1998 (Index No. 242), p. 285,1. 23-p. 287, 
1. 10. 
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33. It is in the best interests of the children that Petitioner be awarded 
the family home. If Petitioner were required to sell the family home, 
she would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the par-
ties' five minor children with the net proceeds available. Moreover, 
awarding Petitioner the family home will cause the least amount of 
disruption to the children's lives. 
There is simply no evidence in the record that supports this finding. To the 
contrary, the evidence in the record is directly contrary to the finding. Where the 
law presumes that an asset must be divided equally between the parties, it is espe-
cially inappropriate for the Court to enter such a finding without appropriately de-
tailed findings setting forth the exceptional ci rcumstances supporting the Court's 
conclusion. Because Judge Young did not enter any detail whatsoever to support his 
conclusory finding regarding the best interests of the children, his refusal to order 
the sale of the parties' major asset was an abuse of discretion, and clearly erroneous. 
5. Judge Young's division of the marital property was clearly erroneous and const i-
tuted an abuse of discretion. 
Judge Young's decision to award the parties' house to the Appellee, along with the 
Court's division of other marital assets, resulted in a grossly unequal and inequitable 
division of the marital assets favoring the Appellee. 
Under Utah law, the District Court was required to value the marital estate at 
the time of the divorce decree or as of the time of trial. Shepard v. Shepard, 876 P.2d 
429, 432 (Utah App. 1994); Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855, P.2d 260, 262 (Utah App. 
1993); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218,1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck, 738 
P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987) . The trial court can use a valuation date other 
than the date of the decree or the date of trial only if the court supports its decision 
"with sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation from the general 
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rule. Shepard at 433. 
The evidence in the record indicates that Judge Young should have valued the 
marital cash as of the time of trial, rather than at a time three years before the Appel-
lee even filed for divorce, for several reasons. First, although the Appellee testified 
that she took $40,000.00 of the family cash because she was contemplating a divorce 
in October 1994, she did not actually file for divorce until July 31, 1997, nearly three 
years later. Second, after the Appellee took most of the family cash, she spent only a 
small amount of it for the Family's needs, making minor purchases of items such as 
food and automobile fuel. Third, Mr. Linnell used the remaining $20,000 of the fam-
ily's cash to pay much of the family's expenses over a period of three years. There-
fore, at the time of trial, the Appellee had almost $57,000 of the marital cash in two 
certificate of deposit accounts, whereas Mr. Linnell had only $7,000 of the mar ital 
cash. 
Nonetheless, Judge Young valued the marital cash assets as of October 1994, 
four years before trial. Judge Young found that as of October 1994 the parties had 
approximately $60,000.00 in cash. Judge Young also found that the A ppellee had 
taken most of the family cash by transferring $40,000.00 of the cash to her own cer-
tificate of deposit accounts, leaving $20,000.00 in the parties'joint a ccount, which 
Mr. Linnell then deposited in a separate account of their own. Based on his October 
1994 valuation of the cash assets, Judge Young ordered the Appellee to pay $10,000 
to Mr. Linnell to "equalize" the division of the parties' cash assets. The result was an 
award to of $47,000 of the marital cash to the Appellee, and an award of $17,000 to 
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Mr. Linnell. Judge Young failed to make findings of fact e xplaining his deviation 
from the general rule. 
This ruling, combined with Judge Young's finding that the Appellee need pay 
Mr. Linnell only $100,000 after a refinance of the home, resulted in an award to the 
Appellee of approximately $313,440 of the $504,359 marital estate. There is nothing 
in the record that indicates that Judge Young made an effort to "equalize" the divi-
sion of the marital assets so that there was some equalization of the standard of liv-
ing for the parties. Nor did he enter findings that detail the basis for his deviation of 
the general rules. Therefore, Judge Young's division of the marital estate was clearly 
erroneous and constitutes an abuse of discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Judge Young's imputation of income to Mr. Linnell for the purpose of calculating 
alimony and child support is clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. So, too, is 
Judge Young's failure to consider two of the three factors a trial court must consider 
in awarding alimony. Judge Young's grossly unequal and inequitable division of the 
marital estate is also clearly erroneous and an abuse of discretion. Moreover, Judge 
Young failed to adequately detail his conclusory findings of fact so that the parties 
and the Court of Appeals can determine the reasoning behind his findings. There-
fore, this Court should reverse such findings and remand this case to the District 
Court for a new trial in compliance with Utah law. In the alternative, this Court 
should reverse such findings and remand to the District Court for an evidentiary 
hearing regarding the issues raised by Mr. Linnell. 
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(3) 30 district judges m the Third District, 
(4) 12 district judges m the Fourth District, 
(5) four district judges m the Fifth District, 
(6) two district judges in the Sixth District, 
(7) three district judges m the Seventh District, and 
(8) two district judges m the Eighth District 1998 
78-1-2.3. Number of juven i l e j u d g e s and jurisdict ions . 
The number of juvenile court judges shall be 
(1) two juvenile judges in the First Juvenile District, 
(2) five juvenile judges m the Second Juvenile District, 
(3) eight juvenile judges in the Third Juvenile District, 
(4) four juvenile judges in the Fourth Juvenile District, 
(5) two juvenile judges m the Fifth Juvenile District, 
(6) one juvenile judge in the Sixth Juvenile District, 
(7) ' two juvenile judges in the Seventh Juvenile Dis-
trict, and 
(8) one juvenile judge m the Eighth Juvenile District 
1999 




78-2-1 Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice and 
associate chief justice — Selection and func-
tions 
78-2-1 5, 78-2-1 6 Repealed 
78-2-2 Supreme Court jurisdiction 
78-2-3 Repealed 
78-2-4 Supreme Court — Rulemaking judges pro tem-
pore and practice of law 
78-2-5 Repealed 
78-2 6 Appellate court administrator 
78-2-7 Repealed 
78-2-7 5 Service of sheriff to court 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14 Repealed 
78-2-1. Number of justices — Terms — Chief justice 
and associate chief justice — Selection and 
functions. 
(1) The Supreme Court consists of five justices 
(2) A justice of the Supreme Court shall be appointed 
initially to serve until the first general election held more than 
three years after the effective date of the appointment There-
after, the term of office of a justice of the Supreme Court is ten 
years and commences on the first Monday in January follow-
ing the date of election A justice whose term expires may 
serve upon request of the Judicial Council until a successor is 
appointed and qualified 
(3) The justices of the Supreme Court shall elect a chief 
justice from among the members of the court by a majority 
vote of all justices The term of the office of chief justice is four 
years The chief justice may serve successive terms The chief 
justice may resign from the office of chief justice without 
resigning fiom the Supreme Court The chief justice may be 
removed from the office of chief justice by a majority vote of all 
justices of the Supreme Court 
(4) If the justices are unable to elect a chief justice within 30 
days of a vacancy in that office, the associate chief justice shall 
act as chief justice until a chief justice is elected under this 
section If the associate chief justice is unable or unwilling to 
act as chief justice, the most senior justice shall act as chief 
justice until a chief justice is elected under this section 
(5) In addition to the chief justice's duties as a member of 
the Supreme Court, the chief justice has duties as provided by 
law 
(6) There is created the office of associate chief justice The 
term of office of the associate chief justice is two years The 
associate chief justice may serve in that office no more than 
two successive terms The associate chief justice shall be 
elected by a majority vote of the members of the Supreme 
Court and shall be allocated duties as the chief justice deter-
mines If the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to 
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief justice 
The chief justice may delegate responsibilities to the associate 
chief justice as consistent with law 1990 
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. Repealed. 1971,1981 
78-2-2. Supreme Court jurisdict ion. 
(1) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to answer 
questions of state law certified by a court of the United States 
(2) The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction to issue all 
extraordinary writs and authority to issue all writs and 
process necessary to carry into effect its orders, judgments, 
and decree^ or m aid of its jurisdiction 
(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals over 
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals, 
(b) cases certified to the Supreme Court by the Court of 
Appeals prior to final judgment by the Court of Appeals, 
(c) discipline of lawvers, 
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Commission, 
(e) final orders and decrees m formal adjudicative 
proceedings originating with 
d) the Public Service Commission, 
(n) the State Tax Commission 
(in) the School and Institutional Trust Lands 
Board of Trustees 
(iv) the Board of Oil Gas and Mining 
(v^ the state engineer or 
(vi) the executive director of the Department of 
Natural Resource;* re\ lewmg actions of the Division 
of Forebtrv Fire and State Lands 
(f) final orders and decreeb of the district court review 
of informal adjudicate e proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e) 
(g) a final judgment or decree of anv court of record 
holding a s tatute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Ltah Constitution, 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony 
d) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony 
(j) orders judgments and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas 
(4) The Supreme Court mav transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction except 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony, 
(b) election and voting contests 
(c) reapportionment of election districts, 
(d) retention or removal of public officers 
(e) matters involving legislative bubpoenas, and 
(f) those matters debcnbed in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d) 
(5) The Supreme Court hab sole dibcretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication but the Supreme Court shall 
78-2-3 JUDICIAL CODE 494 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b) 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, m its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings 1996 
78-2-3. Repealed . 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s pro tem-
pore, and pract ice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the s ta te and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law 1986 
78-2-5. Repea led . 1988 
78-2-6. Appel late court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed . 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of anv sheriff m the state 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repea led . 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l Creation — Seal 
78-2a-2 Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees 
78-2a-3 Court of Appeals jurisdiction 
78-2a-4 Review of actions by Supreme Court 
78-2a-5 Location of Court of Appeals 
78-2a-6 Appellate Mediation Office — Protected records 
and information — Governmental immunity 
78-2a-l . Creat ion — Seal . 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment m 
panels of three judges Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majonty 
vote of all judges The term of office of the presidmg judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in tha t office no more than two 
successive terms The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an actmg presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presidmg judge 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presidmg judge by majonty vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels, 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court, 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals, and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court 
and the Judicial Council 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jur isdict ion. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has junsdiction to issue all ex-
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary 
(a) to carrv into effect its judgments orders, and de-
crees or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction 
(2) The Court of \ppeals has appellate jurisdiction includ-
ing junsdiction of interlocutory appeals over 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals from 
the distnct court review of informal adjudicative proceed-
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis-
sion, State Tax Commission School and Institutional 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer 
(b) appeals from the distnct court review of 
d) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies, and 
(n) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12 1, 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts, 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
cnminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony, 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony, 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
wn t s sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the se ntence for a first 
degree or capital telony 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary wnts challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except m cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
Art. VIII, § 1 CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 688 
Section 
6 [Number of judges of district court and other courts — 
Divisions J 
7 [Qualifications of justices and judges ] 
8 [Vacancies — Nominating commissions — Senate ap-
proval ] 
9 [Judicial retention elections 1 
10 [Restrictions on justices and judges ] 
11 [Judges of courts not of record ] 
12 [Judicial Council — Chief justice as administrative officer 
— Legal counsel ] 
13 [Judicial Conduct Commission ] 
14 [Compensation of justices and judges ] 
15 [Mandatory retirement 1 
16 [Public prosecutors 1 
17 to 28 [Repealed 1 
Sect ion 1. [Judicial p o w e r s — Courts.] 
The judicial power of the state shall be vested in a supreme 
court, m a trial court of general jurisdiction known as the 
district court, and in such other courts as the Legislature by 
statute may establish The Supreme Court, the district court, 
and such other courts designated by statute shall be courts of 
record Courts not of record shall also be established by 
S t a t u t e 1984 (2nd S S ) 
Sec. 2. [Supreme court — Chief jus t i ce — Declaring 
law unconst i tut ional — Jus t i ce unable to par-
ticipate.] 
The Supreme Court shall be the highest court and shall 
consist of at least five justices The number of justices may be 
changed by statute but no change shall have the effect of 
removing a justice from office A chief justice shall be selected 
from among the justices of the Supreme Court as provided by 
statute The chief justice mav resign as chief justice without 
resigning from the Supreme Court The Supreme Court by 
rule may sit and render final judgment either en banc or in 
divisions The court shall not declare any law unconstitutional 
under this constitution or the Constitution of the United 
States except on the concurrence of a majontv of all justices of 
the Supreme Court If a justice of the Supreme Court is 
disqualified or otherwise unable to participate in a cause 
before the court, the chief justice or in the event the chief 
justice is disqualified or unable to participate, the remaining 
justices, shall call an active judge from an appellate court or 
the district court to participate in the cause 1984 (2nd s s ) 
Sec. 3. [Jurisdict ion of Supreme Court.] 
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue 
all extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law 
certified by a court of the United States The Supreme Court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be 
exercised as provided by s tatute , and power to issue all writs 
and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's 
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause 
1984 (2nd S S ) 
Sec. 4. [Rule-making power of Supreme Court — 
J u d g e s pro tempore — Regulat ion of practice 
of law.] 
The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence to be used in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process The Legislature may amend 
the Rules of Procedure and Evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both houses 
of the Legislature Except as otherwise provided by this 
constitution, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired 
justices and judges and judges pro tempore to perform any 
judicial duties Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the 
United States, Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in 
Utah The Supreme Court by rule shall govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to practice law 1984 (2nd S.S.) 
Sec. 5. [Jurisdict ion of district court and other courts 
— Right of appeal.] 
The district court shall have original jurisdiction m all 
mat ters except as limited by this constitution or by statute, 
and power to issue all extraordinary writs The district court 
shall have appellate jurisdiction as provided by statute The 
jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and appellate, 
shall be provided by statute Except for mat ters filed originally 
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal 
of right from the court of original jurisdiction to a court with 
appellate jurisdiction over the cause 1984 (2nd s.s) 
Sec . 6. [Number of judges of district court and other 
courts — Divisions.] 
The number of judges of the district court and of other 
courts of record established by the Legislature shall be pro-
vided by s ta tute No change in the number of judges shall have 
the effect of removing a judge from office during a judge's term 
of office Geographic divisions for all courts of record except 
the Supreme Court may be provided by s tatute No change in 
divisions shall have the effect of removing a judge from office 
during a judge's term of office 1984 (2nd s s ) 
Sec . 7. [Qualifications of jus t i ces and judges . ] 
Supreme Court justices shall be at least 30 years old, United 
States citizens, Utah residents for five years preceding selec-
tion, and admitted to practice law m Utah Judges of other 
courts of record shall be at least 25 years old United States 
citizens Utah residents for three years preceding selection, 
and admitted to practice law in Utah If geographic divisions 
are provided for an> court, judges of that court shall reside in 
the geographic division for which thev are selected 
1984 < 2 n d S S ) 
Sec. 8. [Vacancies — Nominat ing commiss ions — Sen-
ate approval.] 
(1) When a vacancv occurs in a court of record the governor 
shall fill the vacancv bv appointment from a list of at least 
three nominees certified to the governor bv the Judicial 
Nominating Commission having authority over the vacancy 
The governor shall fill the vacancy within 30 davs after 
receiving the list of nominees If the governor fails to fill the 
vacancy withm the time prescribed the chief justice of the 
Supreme Court shall within 20 days make the appointment 
from the list of nominees 
(2) The Legislature by statute shall provide for the nomi-
nating commissions composition and procedures No member 
of the Legislature may serve as a member of, nor may the 
Legislature appoint members to, any Judicial Nominating 
Commission 
(3) The Senate shall consider and render a decision on each 
judicial appointment withm 60 days of the date of appoint-
ment If necessary, the Senate shall convene itself in extraor-
dinary session for the purpose of considering judicial appoint-
ments The appointment shall be effective upon approval of a 
majority of all members of the Senate If the Senate fails to 
approve the appointment, the office shall be considered vacant 
and a new nominating process shall commence 
(4) Selection of judges shall be based solely upon consider-
ation of fitness for office without regard to any partisan 
political consideration 1992 
Sec. 9. [Judicial retention elect ions.] 
Each appointee to a court of record shall be subject to an 
unopposed retention election at the first general election held 
more than three years after appointment Following initial 
voter approval, each Supreme Court justice every tenth year, 
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(2) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of 
shares is valid and enforceable against the holder or a t rans-
feree of the holder if the restriction is authorized by this 
section and its existence is noted conspicuously on the front or 
back of the certificate, or if the restriction is contained in the 
information statement required by Subsection 16-10a-626(2) 
Unless so noted, a restriction is not enforceable against a 
person without knowledge of the restriction 
(3) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of 
shares is authorized 
(a) to maintain the corporation's s tatus when it is 
dependent on the number or identity of its shareholders, 
(b) to preserve entitlements, benefits, or exemptions 
under federal, state, or local laws, and 
(c) for any other reasonable purpose 
(4) A restriction on the transfer or registration of transfer of 
shares may 
(a) obligate the shareholder first to offer to the corpo-
ration or other persons, separately, consecutively, or si-
multaneously, an opportunity to acquire the restricted 
shares 
(b) obligate the corporation or other persons sepa-
rately, consecutively, or simultaneously, to acquire the 
restricted shares 
(c) require as a condition to a transfer or registration, 
that any one or more persons including the corporation or 
any of its shareholders approve the transfer or registra-
tion, if the requirement is not manifestly unreasonable, or 
(d) prohibit the transfer or the registration of a t rans-
fer of the restricted shares to designated persons or 
classes of persons if the prohibition is not manifestly 
unreasonable 
(5) The description of the restrictions on the transfer or 
registration of transfer of shares in Subsection (4) is not 
exhaustive 
(6) For purposes of this section "shares"* includes a security 
convertible into or carrying a right to subscribe for or acquire 
shares 1992 
16-10a-628. Expense of issue. 
A corporation may pay the expenses of selling or underwnt 
mg its shares and of incorporating, organizing or reorganiz 
mg the corporation from the consideration received for shares 
1992 
16-10a-630. Shareholders' preempt ive rights. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of Subsection 16-10a-1704(3), 
the shareholders of a corporation do not have a preemptive 
right to acquire the corporations unissued shares except to 
the extent the articles of incorporation so provide 
(2) A statement mcluded in the articles of incorporation 
that "the corporation elects to have preemptive rights," or 
words of similar import, means that the following principles 
apply except to the extent the articles of incorporation ex 
pressly provide otherwise 
(a) Upon the decision of the board of directors to issue 
shares the shareholders of the corporation have a pre-
emptive right subject to any uniform terms and condi-
tions prescribed by the board of directors, to provide a fair 
and reasonable opportunity to exercise the right to ac 
quire a number of the shares proposed to be issued in an 
amount proportional to their percentage ownership of the 
corporation s outstanding shares 
(b) \ shareholder may waive a preemptive right A 
waiver evidenced by a writing is irrevocable even though 
it is not supported by consideration 
(c) There is no preemptive right with respect to 
d) shares issued as compensation for services to 
directors, officers agents or employees of the corpo-
ration, its subsidiaries or affiliates 
(u) shares issued to satisfy conversion or option 
rights created to provide compensation for services to 
directors, officers, agents, or employees of the corpo-
ration, its subsidiaries, or affiliates, 
(m) shares issued within six months from the 
effective date of incorporation, or 
(IV) shares sold otherwise than for cash 
(d) Holders of shares of any class without general 
voting rights but with preferential rights to distributions 
have no preemptive rights with respect to shares of any 
other class 
(e) Holders of shares of any class with general voting 
rights but without preferential rights to distributions 
have no preemptive rights with respect to shares of any 
class without general voting rights but with preferential 
rights to distributions unless the shares without general 
voting rights but with preferential rights are convertible 
mto or carry a right to subscribe for or acquire shares with 
general voting rights or without preferential rights 
(f) Shares subject to preemptive rights that are not 
acquired by shareholders may be issued to any person for 
a period of one year after being offered to shareholders 
pursuant to the preemptive rights, at a consideration set 
by the board of directors tha t is nor lower than the 
consideration set for the exercise of preemptive rights An 
offer at a lower consideration or after the expiration of the 
one year period is subject to the shareholders preemptive 
rights 
(3) For purposes of this section "sharps" includes a securitv 
convertible mto or carrving a right to su bscnbe for or acquire 
shares 1992 
16-10a-631 Corporation's acquisition of its own 
shares 
(1) \ corporation mav acquire its own shares and shares so 
acquired constitute authorized but unissued shares 
(2) If the articles of incorporation prohibit the reissuance of 
acquired shares 
(a) the number of authorized shares is reduced bv the 
number of shares acquired bv the corporation effective 
upon amendment of the articles of incorporation and 
(b) as provided m Section 16 10a 1002 the board of 
directors may adopt an amendment to the articles of 
incorporation under Subsection (2)(a) without share-
holder action in order to reduce the number of authorized 
shares bv an amount equal to the number of shares 
acquired by the corporation 
(3) A corporation amendmg its articles of incorporation 
pursuant to Subsection (2) shall del i \er to the division for 
filing articles of amendment setting fori h 
(a) the name of the corporation 
(b) the reduction m the number of authorized shares 
itemized by class and series 
(c) the total number of authorized shares itemized by 
class and series remaining after reduction of the shares, 
and 
(d) a statement that the amendment was adopted by 
the board of directors without shareholder action and that 
shareholder action was not required 1992 
16-10a-640. Distr ibutions to shareholders . 
(1) Aboard of directors may authorize and the corporation 
may make distributions to its shareholders subject to any 
restriction in the articles of incorporation and tne limitations 
m Subsection (3) 
(2) The bylaws or in the absence of an applicable bylaw the 
board of directors mav fix a future date as the record date for 
determining shareholders entitled to a distribution other 
than one involving a purchase redemption or other acquisi-
tion of the corporation s shares If a rec ord date is necessary 
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but no future date is so fixed, the record date is the date the 
board of directors authorizes the distribution 
(3) No distribution may be made if, after giving it effect 
(a) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as 
they become due in the usual course of business, or 
(b) the corporation's total assets would be less than the 
sum of its total liabilities plus, unless the articles of 
incorporation permit otherwise, the amount that would be 
needed, if the corporation were to be dissolved at the time 
of the distribution, to satisfy the preferential rights upon 
dissolution of shareholders whose preferential rights are 
superior to those receiving the distribution 
(4) The board of directors may base a determination that a 
distribution is not prohibited under Subsection (3) either on 
financial statements prepared on the basis of accounting 
practices and principles that are reasonable in the circum-
stances, including consolidated financial statements, or on a 
fair valuation or other method that is reasonable in the 
circumstances 
(5) Except as provided in Subsection (7), the effect of a 
distribution under Subsection (3) is measured 
(a) m the case of distribution by purchase, redemption, 
or other acquisition of the corporation's shares, as of the 
earlier of 
(I) the date money or other property is transferred 
or debc is incurred by the corporation, or 
(n) the date the shareholder ceases to be a share-
holder with respect to the acquired shares, 
(b) in the case of any other distribution of indebted-
ness, as of the date the indebtedness is distributed, and 
(c) in all other cases as of 
(u the date the distribution is authorized if the 
pavment occurs within 120 da\s after the date of 
authorization or 
(II) the date the pavment is made if it occurs more 
than 120 davs after the date of authorization 
(6) A corporation a indebtedness to a shareholder incurred 
by reason ot a distribution made m accordance with this 
section if the indebtedness is unsecured is on a pantv with 
the corporation & indebtedness to its general unsecured credi-
tors except to the extent subordinated bv agreement 
(7) Indebtedness of a corporation including indebtedness 
issued as a distribution is not considered a liability for 
purposes of determinations under Subsection (3) if its terms 
provide that pavment of principal and interest are made only 
if and to the extent that payment of a distribution to share-
holders could then be made under this section If the indebt-
edness is issued as a distribution each payment of principal or 
interest on the indebtedness is treated as a distribution, the 
effect of which is measured on the date the payment is actually 
made 1992 
1G-I0a-641, Unclaimed distributions. 
If a corporation has mailed three successive distributions to 
a shareholder addressed to the shareholder's address shown 
on the corporation s current record of shareholders and the 
distributions have been returned as undehverable no further 
attempt to deliver distributions to the shareholder need be 
made until another address for the shareholder is made 
known to the corporation, at which time all distributions 
accumulated by reason of this section shall except as other-




16-10a-701. Annual meeting. 
(1) A corporation shall hold a meeting of shareholders 
annually at a time stated in or fixed in accordance with the 
bylaws 
(2) Annual shareholders' meetings may be held m or out of 
this state at the place stated m or fixed m accordance with the 
bylaws If no place is stated in or fixed m accordance with the 
bylaws, annual meetings shall be held at the corporation's 
principal office 
(3) The failure to hold an annual meeting at the time stated 
in or fixed m accordance with a corporation's bvlaws does not 
affect the validity of any corporate action or work a forfeiture 
or dissolution of the corporation 1992 
16-10a-702. Special meet ing . 
(1) A corporation shall hold a special meeting of sharehold-
ers 
(a) on call of its board of directors or the person or 
persons authonzed by the bylaws to call a special meet-
ing, or 
(b) if the holders of shares representing at least ten 
percent of all the votes entitled to be cast on any issue 
proposed to be considered at the proposed special meeting 
sign, date and deliver to the corporation's secretary one 
or more written demands for the meeting, stating the 
purpose or purposes for which it is to be held 
(2) If not otherwise fixed under Sections 16-10a-703 or 
16-10a-"07, the record date for determining shareholders 
entitled to demand a special meeting pursuant to Subsection 
(1Kb) is the earliest date of any of the demands pursuant to 
which the meeting is called or the date that is sixty days prior 
to the date the first of the written demands pursuant to which 
the meeting is called is received by the corporation whichever 
is later 
(3) Special shareholders' meetings may be held in or out of 
this state at the olace stated in or fixed in accordance with the 
bylaws If no place is stated or fixed in accordance with the 
bylaws special meetings shall be held at the corporations 
principal office 
(4; Only business within the purpose or purposes described 
in the meeting notice required bv Subsection 16-10a-705(3) 
may be conducted at a special shareholders meeting unless 
notice of the meeting is waived by all shareholders pursuant to 
Section 16 10a-706 1992 
16-10a-703. Court-ordered meet ing 
(1) The district court of the county in this state where a 
corporation's pnncipal office or if it has no principal office in 
this state its registered office is located may summarily order 
a meeting of shareholders to be held 
(a) on application of anv shareholder of the corporation 
entitled to participate m an annual meeting or any 
director of the corporation if an annual meeting was not 
held within 15 months after its last annual meeting, or if 
there has been no annual meeting, the date of incorpora-
tion or 
(b) on application of any person who participated in a 
call of or demand for a special meeting effective under 
Subsection 16-10a-702(l) if 
(I) notice of the special meeting was not given 
within 60 days after the date of the call or the date 
the last of the demands necessary to require the 
calling of the meeting was delivered to the corpora-
tion pursuant to Subsection 16-10a-702(l)(b), as the 
case may be or 
(II) the special meeting was not held m accordance 
with the notice 
(2) The court may fix the time and place of the meeting, 
state whether or not it is an annual or special meeting, 
determine the shares entitled to participate m the meeting, 
specify a record date for determining shareholders entitled to 
notice of and to vote at the meeting, prescribe the form and 
content of the meeting notice fi\ the quorum required for 
specific matters to be considered at the meeting, or direct that 
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(c) a written statement indicating whether or not the 
amount of child support requested is consistent with the 
guidelines. 
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Sub-
section (1) is not available, a verified representation of the 
defaulting party's income by the moving party, based on 
the best evidence available, may be submitted. 
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and may only 
be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting 
party in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or 
Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in 
an administrative proceeding. 
(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties 
shall submit: 
(i) a completed child support worksheet; 
(ii) the financial verification required by Subsec-
tion 78-45-7.5(5); and 
(iii) a written statement indicating whether or not 
the amount of child support requested is consistent 
with the guidelines. 
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall 
be used to review the adequacy of a child support order 
negotiated by the parents. 
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or combined 
child support and alimony is adequate under the guide-
lines if the stipulated child support amount or combined 
amount equals or exceeds the base child support award 
required by the guidelines. 1994 
78-45-7.4. Ob l iga t ion — Adjus t ed g ros s i n c o m e used. 
Adjusted gross income shall be used m calculating each 
parent's share of the base combined child support obligation. 
Only income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child 
may be used to determine the award under these guidelines 
1994 
78-45-7.5. D e t e r m i n a t i o n of g r o s s i n c o m e — I m p u t e d 
i n c o m e . 
(1) As used in the guidelines, 'gross income" includes 
(a) prospective income from any source, including 
nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3), and 
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions, royal-
ties, bonuses, rents, gifts from an>one, prizes, dividends, 
severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony 
from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social 
security benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unem-
ployment compensation, disability insurance benefits, 
and payments from unonmeans-tested" government pro-
grams. 
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited to the 
equivalent of one full-time 40-hour job However, if and only if 
during the time prior to the original support order, the parent 
normally and consistently worked more than 40 hours at his 
job, the court may consider this extra time as a pattern in 
calculating the parent's ability to provide child support 
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are 
(a) cash assistance provided under Title 35A, Chapter 
3, Par t 3, Family Employment Program, 
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy program, 
the Job Training Partnership Act, Supplemental Security 
Income, Social Security Disability Insurance, Medicaid, 
Food Stamps, or General Assistance, and 
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits re-
ceived by a parent. 
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of 
a business shall be calculated by subtracting necessary 
expenses required for belf-employment or business opera-
tion from gross receipts The income and expenses from 
self-employment or operation of a business shall be re-
viewed to determine an appropriate level of gross income 
available to the parent to satisfy a child support award. 
Only those expenses necessary to allow the business to 
operate at a reasonable level may be deducted from gross 
receipts. 
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection 
may differ from the amount of business income deter-
mined for tax purposes. 
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be com-
puted on an annual basis and then recalculated to deter-
mine the average gross monthly income. 
(b) Each parent shall provide verification of current 
income. Each parent shall provide year-to-date pay stubs 
or employer statements and complete copies of tax re-
turns from at least the most recent year unless the court 
finds the verification is not reasonably available. Verifica-
tion of income from records maintained by the Depart-
ment of Workforce Services may be s ubstituted for pay 
stubs, employer statements, and income tax returns. 
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be used to 
determine whether an underemployment or over-
employment situation exists. 
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the parent 
under Subsection (7). 
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the 
parent stipulates to the amount imputed or a hearing is 
held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily 
unemployed or underemployed. 
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be 
based upon employment potential and probable earnings 
as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, 
and prevailing earnings for persons of similar back-
grounds m the communitv 
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall 
be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 
40-hour work week To impute a greater income, the judge 
in a judicial proceeding or the presioing officer in an 
administrative proceeding shall enter specific findings of 
fact as to the evidentiary basis for the imputation 
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the following 
conditions exist 
(I) the reasonable costs of child care for the par-
ents ' minor children approach or equal the amount of 
income the custodial parent can earn. 
(n) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to 
the extent he cannot earn minimum wage, 
(in) a parent is engaged in career or occupational 
training to establish basic job skills; or 
(IV) unusual emotional or physical needs of a child 
require the custodial parent's presence m the home. 
(8) fa) Gross income may not include the earnings of a 
minor child who is the subject of a child support award 
nor benefits to a minor child in the child's own right such 
as Supplemental Security Income 
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child due to 
the earnings of a parent shall be credited as child support 
to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by 
crediting the amount against the potential obligation of 
that parent Other unearned income of a child may be 
considered as mcome to a parent depending upon the 
circumstances of each case 1998 
78-45-7.6. Adjus ted g ross i ncome . 
(1) As used m the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the 
amount calculated by subtracting from gross income alimony 
previously ordered and paid and child support previously 
ordered 
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child support 
award by adjusting the ^ross income^ of the parents for 
alimony ordered in the pending proceeding In establishing 
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make a defense as is jus t to protect the rights of the 
respondent and the interests of the state 
(d) In all actions the court and judge have jurisdiction 
over the payment of alimony, the distribution of property, 
and the custody and maintenance of minor children, as 
the courts and judges possess in other actions for divorce. 
(e) The petitioner or respondent may, if the respondent 
resides m this state, upon notice, have the respondent 
brought into the court at trial, or have an examination of 
the respondent by two or more competent physicians, to 
determine the mental condition of the respondent For 
this purpose either party may have leave from the court to 
enter any asylum or institution where the respondent 
may be confined The costs of court in this action shall be 
apportioned by the court 1997 
30-3-2. Right of husband to divorce . 
The husband may m all cases obtain a divorce from his wife 
for the same causes and in the same manner as the wife may 
obtain a divorce from her husband 1953 
30-3-3. Award of costs , a t torney and w i t n e s s fees — 
Temporary alimony. 
(1) In any action filed under Title 30, Chapter 3, 4, or 6, and 
m any action to establish an order of custody, visitation, child 
support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic case, 
the court may order a party to pay the costs, attorney fees, and 
witness fees, including expert witness fees, of the other party 
to enable the other party to prosecute or defend the action The 
order may include provision for costs of the action 
(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody, visitation, 
child support, alimony, or division of property in a domestic 
case, the court may award costs and attorney fees upon 
determining that the party suostant ia lh prevailed upon the 
claim or defense The court in its discretion, may award no 
fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the party 
is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not 
awarding fees 
(3) In any action listed m Subsection '1) the court may 
order a party to provide money during the pendenc\ of the 
action for the separate support and maintenance of the other 
party and of any children m the custodv of the other p a m 
(4) Orders entered under this section prior to entrj of the 
final order or judgment may be amended during the course of 
the action or in the final order or judgment 1993 
30-3-4. P l e a d i n g s — F i n d i n g s — D e c r e e — Use of affi-
d a v i t — S e a l i n g . 
(1) (a) The complaint shall be in writing and signed b\ the 
petitioner or petitioner's attorney 
(b; A decree of divorce may not be granted upon default 
or otherwise except upon legal evidence taken m the 
cause If the decree is to be entered upon the default of the 
respondent, evidence to support the decree may be sub-
mitted upon the affidavit of the petitioner with the ap-
proval of the court 
(c) If the petitioner and the respondent ha \ e a child or 
children, a decree of divorce may not be granted until both 
parties have attended the mandatory course described in 
Section 30-3-113, and h a \ e presented a certificate of 
course completion to the court The court may warv e this 
requirement, on its own motion or on the motion of one of 
the parties, if it determines course attendance and 
completion are not necessary, appropriate, feasible or in 
the best interest of the parties 
(d) All hearings and trials for divorce shall be held 
before the court or the court commissioner as provided by 
Section 78-3-31 and rules of the Judicial Council The 
court or the commissioner in all divorce cases shall enter 
the decree upon the evidence or, in the case of a decree 
after default of the respondent, upon the petitioner's 
affidavit 
(2) The file, except the decree of divorce, may be sealed by 
order of the court upon the motion of either party The sealed 
portion of the file is available to the public only upon an order 
of the court. The concerned parties, the attorneys of record or 
attorney filing a notice of appearance m the action, the Office 
of Recovery Services if a party to the proceedings has applied 
for or is receiving public assistance, or the court have full 
access to the entire record This sealing does not apply to 
subsequent filings to enforce or amend the decree 1997 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 1990 
30-3-5. Dispos i t ion of property — Maintenance and 
heal th care of part ies and chi ldren — Divi-
s ion of debts — Court to have cont inuing 
jur isdict ion — Custody and vis itat ion — De-
terminat ion of al imony — Nonmeritorious pe-
t i t ion for modification. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable orders relating to the children property, 
debts or obligations, and parties The court shall mclude the 
following in every decree of divorce 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of 
reasonable and necessary medical and dental expenses of 
the dependent children 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable 
cost, an order requiring the purchase and maintenance of 
appropriate health, hospital, and dental care insurance 
for the dependent children, 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6 5 
(I) an order specifying which party is responsible 
for the pavment of joint debts obligations or liabili-
ties of the parties contracted or incurred during 
marriage, 
(II) an order requiring the parties to notify respec-
tive creditors or obligees regarding the courts divi-
sion of debts obligations or liabilities and regarding 
the parties separate current addresses and 
(III) provisions for the enforcement of these orders, 
and 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance 
with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Recoverv Services 
(2) The court may include, m an order determining child 
support, an order assigning financial responsibility for all or a 
portion of child care expenses incurred on behalf of the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent If the court determines that the 
circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent chil-
dren would be adequately cared for, it may include an order 
allowing the noncustodial parent to provide child care for the 
dependent children, necessitated by the employment or train-
ing of the custodial parent 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subse-
quent changes or new orders for the custody of the children 
and their support maintenance, health, and dental care, and 
for distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is 
reasonable and necessary 
(4) (a) In determining visitation rights of parents, grand-
parents, and other members of the immediate family, the 
court shall consider the best interest of the child 
(b) Upon a specific finding by the court of the need for 
peace officer enforcement the court may include m an 
order establishing a visitation schedule a provision, 
among other things authorizing any peace officer to 
enforce a court ordered \ lsitation schedule entered under 
this chapter 
(5) If a petition for modification of child custody or visita-
tion provisions of a court order is made and denied, the court 
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shall order the petitioner to pay the reasonable attorneys' fees 
expended by the prevailing party m that action if the court 
determines that the petition was without merit and not 
asserted or defended against in good faith 
(6) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a 
visitation order by a parent a grandparent or other member 
of the immediate family pursuant to Section 78-32-12 2 where 
a visitation right has been previously granted by the court, the 
court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing 
par ty because of the other party's failure to provide or exercise 
court-ordered visitation 
(7) (a) The court shall consider at least the following fac-
tors in determining alimony 
d) the financial condition and needs of the recipi-
ent spouse, 
(u) the recipients earning capacity or ability to 
produce income, 
(111) the ability of the payor spouse to provide 
support 
dv) the length of the marriage 
(v) whether the recipient spouse has custody of 
mmor children requiring support 
(vi) whether the recipient spouse worked m a busi 
ness owned or operated by the payor spouse and 
(vn) whether the recipient spouse directly contrib-
uted to anv increase in the payor spouses skill oy 
paying for education received bv the payor spouse or 
allowing the payor spouse to attend school during the 
marriage 
(b) The court mav consider the fault of the parties in 
determining alimony 
(c) As a general rule the court should look to the 
standard of living existing at the time of separation m 
determining alimony in accordance with Subsection 
(7)(a) However the court shall consider all relevant facts 
and equitable principles and may m its discretion base 
alimonv on the standard of living that existed at the time 
of trial In marriages of short duration when no children 
have been conceived or born during the marriage the 
court may consider the standard of living that existed at 
the time of the marriage 
(d) The court may under appropriate circumstances 
at tempt to equalize the parties respective standards of 
living 
(e) When a marriage of long duration dissolves on the 
threshold of a major change in the income of one of the 
spouses due to the collective efforts of both that change 
shall be considered in dividing the marital property and 
in determining the amount of alimonv If one spouses 
earning capacity has been greatly enhanced through the 
efforts of both spouses during the marriage the court ma^ 
make a compensating adjustment in dividing the marital 
property and awarding alimony 
(f) In determining alimony when a marriage of short 
duration dissolves and no children have been conceived 
or born during the marriage the court may consider 
restoring each party to the condition which existed at the 
time of the marriage 
(g) (l) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make 
substantive changes and new orders regarding ah 
monv based on a substantial material change in 
circumstances not foreseeable at the time of the 
divorce 
(n) The court mav not modify alimonv or issue a 
new order for alimonv to address needs of the recipi 
ent that did not exist at the time the decree was 
entered unless the court finds extenuating circum 
stances that justify that action 
(m) In determining alimony, the income of any 
subsequent spouse of the payor may not be consid 
ered, except as provided in this Subsection (7) 
(A) The court may consider the subsequent 
spouse's financial ability to share living ex 
penses 
(B) The court may consider the income of a 
subsequent spouse if the court finds that the 
payor's improper conduct justifies that consider 
ahon 
(h) Alimony may not be ordered for a duration longer 
than the number of years that the marriage existed 
unless, at any time prior to termination of alimony, the 
court finds extenuating circumstances that justify the 
payment of alimony for a longer period of time 
(8) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides other 
wise any order of the court tha t a party pay alimony to a 
former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage 
or death of that former spouse However if th e remarriage is 
annulled and found to be void ab initio payment of alimony 
shall resume if the partv paying alimony is made a party to 
the action of annulment and his rights are determined 
(9) Any order of the court that a partv psv alimonv to a 
former spouse terminates upon establishment bv the party 
paving alimonv that the former spouse is cohabitatmg with 
another person 1999 
30-3-5.1. P rov i s ion for i n c o m e w i t h h o l d i n g in ch i ld 
s u p p o r t o rder . 
Whenever a court enters an order for child upport it shall 
include in the order a provision for withholding income as a 
means of collecting child support as provided in Title 62-i 
Chapter 11 Recovery Services 199** 
30-3-5 2. Al lega t ions of ch i ld a b u s e o r ch i ld s exua l 
a b u s e — Inves t i ga t i on 
When in an\ di\orce proceeding or upon a request for 
modification of a di orce decree ^n allegation of child abuse or 
child sexual abuse is made mphcating either party the court 
after making an inquirv mav order that an investigation be 
conducted by the Division of Child and Familv Services within 
the Department of Human Services m accordance with Title 
62A Chapter 4a \ final award of custodv or visi tation may not 
be rendered until a report on that investigation consistent 
with Section 62A 4a 412 is received by the < ourt That mves 
tigation shall be conducted by the Division of Child and 
Family Services within 30 davs of the courts notice and 
request for an investigation In reviewing this report the 
court shall complv with Section 78 7 9 1999 
30-3-5.5,30-3-6 Repea l ed . 1991 1993 
30-3-7. When d e c r e e b e c o m e s a b s o l u t e 
(1) The decree of divorce becomes absolute 
(a) on the date it is signed bv th^ court and entered bv 
the clerk in the register of actions if both the parties who 
have a child or children have completed attendance at the 
mandatory course for divorcing parents as provided m 
Section 30 3 11 3 except if the court waives the require 
ment on its own motion or on the motion of one of the 
parties upon determination that course al tendance and 
completion are not necessarv appropriate feasible or in 
the best interest of the parties 
(b) at the expiration of a period of time the court mav 
specifically designate unless an appeal or other proceed 
ings for review are pending or 
(c) when the court before the decree becomes absolute 
for sufficient cause otherwise orders 
(2) The court upon application or on its own motion for 
good cause shown may waive alter or extend a designated 
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THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND 
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF 
Petitioner, OBJECTION TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND OBJECTION TO FORM OF PROPOSED 
v. DIVORCE DECREE 
DENNIS D. LINNELL Case No. 974903252 
Respondent. Judge David S. Young 
Respondent Dennis D. Linnell respectfully submits his Memorandum of Points and 
Authorities in support of his Objection to the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
submitted by Petitioner in this matter and his Objection to the form of the proposed Divorce 
Decree. 
INTRODUCTION 
The above entitled case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young on December 17, 
18 and 21, 1998. Mr. Harold G. Christensen, counsel for Petitioner, was asked by the Court to 
submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and also a proposed divorce decree. 
Mr. Christensen did so, and his proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and proposed 
Decree of Divorce are attached hereto collectively as Exhibit "A." 
In this Memorandum, Respondent shall, first, list those findings of fact which Respondent 
finds consistent with the Court's findings and rulings, second, set forth his specific objections to 
the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law as necessary to make the same consistent 
with the Court's findings and rulings, and third, list those findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that were omitted from the proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that should be 
contained in the same in order to accurately reflect the Court's findings and rulings. Respondent 
shall then detail his objection to the form of the proposed Divorce Decree. 
I. Objections to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
A. Findings of Fact Not Disputed bv Respondent. Respondent has no objection to 
the content of those proposed findings of fact set forth in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 
12, 13, 16, 17, 18, 22, 23, 31, 40, 41, 43, 45 as the Respondent finds the same to 
be consistent with the Court's findings and rulings. Moreover, Respondent does 
not object to Conclusions of Law numbered 2, 3 and 4. 
B. Findings of Fact Disputed bv Respondent. The Respondent disputes the following 
proposed findings of fact for the following reasons, with the intent to make the 
same consistent with the findings of the Court and the undisputed testimony 
presented at the trial of this matter: 
1. Finding No. 5. Respondent does not object to the first three sentences of 
proposed Finding No. 5. Respondent objects to the last sentence of 
proposed Finding No. 5 reading *'It is in the best interests of the minor 
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home," as being 
duplicative of proposed Finding No. 33. Respondent would delete the 
sentence from proposed Finding No. 5 and leave the sentence in proposed 
Finding No. 33. 
2. Finding No. 6. Respondent objects to the second and third sentences as 
inaccurate. Those sentences should be replaced with the following text: 
"Respondent managed LawnLife Corporation, a lawn care company, from 
1984 to January of 1995, when his employment with LawnLife 
Corporation was involuntarily terminated. After his employment with 
LawnLife Corporation was involuntarily terminated, Respondent, from 
January of 1995 through the Fall of 1996, performed lawn care consulting 
services, primarily for Permagreen. When Permagreen informed 
Respondent in the Fall of 1996 that Permagreen would no longer be 
needing Respondent's consulting services, Respondent created a new lawn 
care company, Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc., consistent with 
Respondent's highest and best use, namely, building and managing a lawn 
care company. 
3. Finding No. 7. Respondent objects to Finding No. 7 because (1) it 
excludes any reference to the parties' 1997 income and (2) the "'total 
income" reported includes interest and investment income on certificates 
of deposit and investments in Petitioner's name. Thus, not all of that 
"total income" belongs to Respondent. Proposed Finding No. 7 should 
read: 
The parties' respective incomes from 1993 through 1998, according to 
their tax returns and testimony, is as follows: 
For 1993: 
Wages 
K-l on LawnLife stock 
Petitioner 


































Taxable Employer paid benefits 









































































































For 1998 (Excluding Imputed Income) 
Wages 
Rental Income 
Investment Income (Est) 2,400 
Totals: 6,300 14,228.31 
Finding No. 8. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because it 
fails to recognize the undisputed evidence that (1) Respondent's 
termination of employment with Lawnlife was involuntary and against his 
will, (2) Respondent's loss of the Permagreen consulting account was 
involuntary on Respondent's part, and (3) Respondent started Green 
Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. with Steve Nicholaides. Finding of Fact No. 8 
should read as follows: 
After he was involuntarily terminated from employment as 
manager of LawnLife Corporation in January of 1995 and 
involuntarily lost Permagreen, his main account as a lawn care 
consultant in the Fall of 1996, Respondent, after discussing career 
and work options with Petitioner, voluntarily decided, with 
Petitioner's support, to start and build a new lawn care business so 
that he could continue to work in a manner consistent with his 
highest and best use and protected from others being able to 
terminate his services. In 1997, Respondent and Steve Nicholaides 
formed Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. as a fifty percent equal 
shareholders. 
Finding No. 10. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1) 
the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings capacity expert, Dr. 
Kristie Farnsworth, was that there were no lawn care management jobs 
available in Utah generally, (2) Petitioner's earnings capacity expert's 
definition of "a reasonable period of time of searching" for a lawn care 
management job in Utah with an income level between $30,000 and 
$50,000 was "sometime within the next two years," and (3) the Court 
found that given that it was Respondent's highest and best use to build and 
manage the business of Green Pointe, the Court would not look to what 
Respondent could earn elsewhere as a manager of another lawn care 
company, but rather at what the Court determined Respondent could earn 
at Green Pointe. The Court then imputed a wage of $40,000 to 
Respondent because the Court found that with the expected future growth 
of Green Pointe, Green Pointe would be able to pay Respondent that 
amount in the future. 
Finding No. 11. Respondent objects to said proposed finding as being 
wholly inconsistent with his testimony. Respondent never at any time, 
including at the trial, acknowledged his ability to earn $35,000 per year at 
trial. Respondent understands that Petitioner, in proposing this Finding, is 
referring to statements made by the Commission in his Pretrial Order to 
the effect that in the Commissioner's view, Respondent's income 
imputation would be somewhere between $30,000 and $70,000 per year. 
Importantly, that was the Commissioner's view (and a view Respondent 
disagrees with), not Respondent's testimony. 
7. Finding No. 14. Respondent objects to the last sentence of said proposed 
finding because the undisputed evidence was that Petitioner, a few weeks 
prior to filing for divorce, enrolled in school at Salt Lake Community 
College on a full time basis, and since then, she has continued to be 
enrolled in school on a full-time basis. 
8. Finding No. 15. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1) 
it fails to state that Petitioner commenced her schooling mere weeks 
before she filed for divorce, fails to state that Petitioner devotes her full 
time efforts to her schooling activities and (3) fails to reference 
Respondent's interest and investment income. That proposed finding 
should read as follows: 
A few weeks prior to filing her petition for divorce in this matter, 
Petitioner enrolled as a full-time student at Salt Lake Community 
College, with the intent of pursuing a five year 
pharmacist/technician educational program. Since then, Petitioner 
has devoted her full time and efforts to that educational pursuit. As 
a consequence, Petitioner has not maintained any employment. 
However, Petitioner earns $325 per month by renting a room in the 
family home to a college student and further earns approximately 
$200 per month in interest and investment income on her cash 
assets. 
9. Finding Nos. 19 and 20. Respondent objects to said proposed findings to 
the extent that they erroneously assert that "the parties contemplated 
obtaining a divorce" in 1994, given that it was only Petitioner who had 
that contemplation. Respondent further objects to said proposed findings 
to the extent that they assert that "the Parties each opened separate 
accounts and Respondent closed their joint account," to the extent that it 
implies that the parties mutually agreed to do so. The evidence at trial was 
that Petitioner unilaterally, and without prior notice to Respondent, took 
$40,000 out of the parties' joint checking account at America First Credit 
Union. Respondent then took $20,000 out of the account and moved it to 
his separate America First Credit Union Account so that he would have 
funds to support the family without that money being taken by Petitioner 
as well, and left the remaining $5,000 in the joint account to pay family 
bills. 
Finding No. 21. Respondent objects to said proposed finding that 
"Respondent paid some of the household expenses but provided no funds 
for food or other expenses for the family," because the undisputed 
testimony is that (1) Respondent paid all of the household and 
expenditures, including mortgage payment, home insurance, all utilities, 
telephone bill, car insurance, health insurance, car repairs, missionary 
support payments, violin lessons, out-of-pocket medical expenses, kids 
shoes and clothing, kids' school fees and expenses (see Denny's expense 
spreadsheet), (2) the only exceptions were food and Petitioner's auto's gas 
expenses, which food and Petitioner's auto's gas expenses were paid for 
the most part by Petitioner, and (3) the source of Respondent's funds for 
paying those expenditures, as admitted in the proposed finding, was the 
First Security certificate of deposit accounts which held the $40,000 which 
Petitioner took from the parties' joint cash assets in America First Credit 
Union. It is thus grossly unfair and inaccurate to state that Respondent 
"provided no funds for food or other expenses of the family." 
11. Finding No. 24. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $ 1,135.00 in 
his personal checking account, a joint marital asset, which should be 
awarded to him." 
12. Finding No. 25. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $1,322.00 in 
his money market account, a joint marital asset and which, with the 
balance in his America First Credit Union account, represents the balance 
of the $20,000 Respondent removed from the parties' joint account with 
America First Credit Union in October of 1994, which should be awarded 
to him." 
13. Finding No. 26. The Finding should read: "Respondent has $5,708.27 in 
his America First Credit Union checking account, a joint marital asset and 
which, with the balance in his money market account, represents the 
balance of the $20,000 Respondent removed from the parties' joint 
account with America First Credit Union in October of 1994. which 
should be awarded to him." 
14. Finding No. 27. The finding should read: "Petitioner has $2,000.00 in her 
First Security Bank savings account, a joint marital asset and which 
represents the remaining proceeds from Petitioner's sale of the Parties' 
Suburban for approximately $6,000, which, at a value of $2,000, should be 
awarded to her." 
15. Finding No. 28. The finding should read: "The Parties have a 50% interest 
in a boat valued at $3,000, a joint marital asset, which 50% interest, equal 
ss 
to $1,500.00, should be awarded to Respondent." 
16. Finding No. 29. The finding should read: "Respondent has a 1993 Toyota 
worth $9,000.00, a joint marital asset, which should be awarded to him. 
Respondent should also be responsible for the $1,014.00 liability on the 
vehicle." 
17. Finding No. 30. Respondent objects to said proposed finding because (1) 
it fails to indicate that the home is a marital asset otherwise subject to 
equal division, and (2) only two of the parties' seven children, Kara and 
Mary Jane, have never lived in any other home (2/7 is not a "majority"). 
18. Finding No. 32. Respondent objects to said proposed finding in that it 
fails to set a drop-dead date by which Petitioner must complete the 
refinancing and pay the $100,000 to Respondent. In this regard, the Court 
at trial on December 21, 1998, asked Petitioner's Counsel if Petitioner 
could determine within 30 days whether she could refinance the home and 
pay Respondent the $100,000. A drop-dead date must be established in 
order to prevent Petitioner's refinancing of the home and payment of the 
$100,000 to Respondent from being delayed indefinitely. Respondent 
further objects to the language of said proposed finding that "the costs of 
such refinancing should be shared equally by the Parties." The Court's 
specific direction in this regard was that Petitioner would pay all costs of 
the refinancing. 
19. Finding No. 33. Respondent objects to the second sentence of said finding 
on the grounds that Petitioner presented absolutely no testimony in support 
<\0 
of the asserted finding, and the testimony of Respondent's real estate 
expert, Veda Barrie, as proffered by Respondent, was that there are 
numerous homes in the immediate neighborhood that would constitute 
suitable housing for Petitioner and the Parties' five children with no 
disruption to the children whatsoever. 
20. Finding No. 34. The finding should read: "Petitioner has $16,041.33 in 
her American Funds Group IRA account, a marital asset, which should be 
awarded to her." 
21. Finding No. 35. The finding should read: "Respondent has $25,903.00 in 
his American Funds Group IRA account, a marital asset, which should be 
awarded to him." 
22. Finding No. 36. The finding should read: "Respondent has a $457.00 
equity in his Southland Insurance policy, a marital asset, which should be 
awarded to him." 
23. Finding No. 37. The finding should read: "Respondent has a $5,608.00 
equity in his Reliastar Insurance policy, a marital asset, which should be 
awarded to him." 
24. Finding No. 38. The finding should read: "Petitioner has credit card debt 
of $1,264.39, a marital debt, which she should be responsible for. 
25. Finding No. 39. The finding should read: "Respondent has credit card 
debt of $1,000.00, a marital debt, which he should be responsible for. 
26. Finding No. 42. Given that the issue of health insurance was never raised 
by Petitioner at trial, nor discussed by the Court or either Party whatsoever 
before, during or after trial, there can be no finding of fact as to health 
insurance. Accordingly, proposed Finding No. 42 should be deleted. 
Having said that, however, the issue of health insurance must, by statute, 
be addressed in the Divorce Decree. In this regard, the Divorce Decree 
provision regarding health insurance should be consistent with applicable 
statutes, which provide that if insurance is available to one or the other 
parties for the minor children through work at a reasonable cost, then that 
party should provide it Any costs to the parties for insurance premiums or 
non-covered medical expenses for the minor children should be equally 
split. By law and by insurance contract, Respondent cannot be responsible 
for covering Petitioner on any insurance he maintains for himself and the 
minor children, nor can he be responsible for any costs associated with any 
insurance coverage Petitioner may obtain either under continuation of 
coverage (COBRA) type benefits or otherwise. To the extent Petitioner 
seeks anything to the contrary, Respondent strenuously objects. 
Finding No. 44. The finding should itemize Respondent's reasonable 
monthly expenses just as Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses in 





Car Payment: $155.00 
Car Insurance: $50.00 




Laundry & Cleaning $30.00 
Miscellaneous: $35.00 
TOTAL: $949.00 
28. Finding No. 46. Petitioner objects to said proposed finding because (1) it 
fails to provide that alimony would cease upon the earliest to occur of 26 
years (the length of the parties' marriage), her remarriage, cohabitation, 
and (2) the alimony calculation was based solely on Respondent's imputed 
income level of $40,000 and Petitioner's reasonable living expenses of 
$2,486, without taking into consideration either Petitioner's imputed 
income, Petitioner's actual rental and investment income, or Respondent's 
ability to pay said alimony in light of his separate necessary and reasonable 
living expenses. 
29. Conclusions of Law No. 1. To the extent that any of the foregoing 
Findings of Fact objected to herein constitute Conclusions of Law as 
asserted in the Paragraph 1 of the proposed Conclusions of Law, 
Respondent objects thereto for the same reasons set forth above. 
Omitted Findings of Fact. Respondent submits that the following findings of fact 
should be a part of the Court's findings of fact in order to make the same 
consistent with the evidence and the Court's findings. In this regard, Respondent 
maintains that the list of findings set forth in Petitioner's proposed form is 
selective and incomplete, and that as a matter of law, Respondent is entitled to a 
finding of fact on all material issues. See The Boyer Co. v. Lignell 567 P.2d 
1112 (Utah 1977) (the law is well settled that it is the duty of the trial judge in 
contested cases to find facts upon all material issues submitted for decision unless 
findings are waived). Those findings of fact that should be added to the final 
findings of fact are as follows: 
1. Respondent's highest and best use is building and managing a lawn care 
company. 
2. Respondent's termination as an employee and manager of Lawnlife 
Corporation in January of 1995 was involuntary on Respondent's part. 
3. Respondent was forced to quit his lawn care related consulting business in 
the fall of 1996 when Permagreen, his only client, unilaterally terminated 
its consulting arrangement with Respondent. 
4. From and after Respondent's formation of Green Pointe Lawncare, Inc. in 
January of 1997, Respondent has, with Steve Nicholaides who owns 50% 
of Green Pointe, at all times been engaged on a full time basis in building, 
managing and performing the customer service functions of that lawn care 
business. 
5. Green Pointe, even though it did not pay Respondent or Steve Nicholaides 
any money for their efforts in 1997, still experienced a loss from 
operations in 1997 of $7,418.94. 
6. Green Pointe had sufficient revenues in 1998 to start paying monies to 
Respondent and Steve Nicholaides in June of 1998. By December of 
1998, Green Pointe had paid Respondent and Steve Nicholaides salaries of 
$14, 227.31 each. 
7. If Green Pointe were to hire the services of lawn care technicians to 
perform the services performed by Respondent and Steve Nicholaides, 
Green Pointe would have had to pay more to those third-party lawn care 
technicians than it paid to Respondent and Steve Nicholaides, thus 
increasing the net operating loss that Green Pointe actually experienced in 
1998. 
8. With paying salaries of $14,227.31 each to Respondent and Steve 
Nicholaides, Green Pointe experienced a net operating loss of $1,146.35 
through December 10, 1998. 
9. Green Pointe had cash in the bank at the time of trial of $36,085.44, which 
Green Pointe needed to fund its operating expenditures of approximately 
$9,000 per month through the "down" winter months, purchase another 
truck to continue the company's ability to grow, and pay the salary 
expenses of another employee that the company needed to hire to continue 
the company's ability to grow. 




Accounts Receivables: 2,160.66 
Total Current Assets: $38,246.10 
Fixed Assets: 
Computer Software: 2,575.00 
Computer Equipment: 3,081.98 
Office Equipment: 1,583.69 
Vehicles & Equipment: 62,295.32 
Less Accum. Depreciation: (24,940.96) 
Total Fixed Assets: $44,595.03 
Total Assets: $82,841.13 
11. According to it's balance sheet, Green Pointe's liabilities at the time of 









Note to Herald Hammond: 
Accounts Payable: 
Zions Green Pointe Credit Card: 
Payroll Taxes Payable: 
Prepaid Contract Liability: 
Truck Loan: Zions 









12. As of the time of trial, Green Pointe did not have sufficient assets, 
considering asset obsolescence and depreciation, to pay off all of its 
liabilities. 
13. Green Pointe's assets and liabilities as of the time of trial were such that if 
Green Pointe were to distribute its $36,085.44 in cash to its shareholders, 
it would not be able to pay off its liabililities. 
14. Green Pointe's gross revenues from operations in 1998 were $119,323.52. 
15. The value of Respondent's 50% stock interest in Green Pointe of $35,800 
was determined solely by multiplying the company's 1998 gross revenues 
of $119,323.52 by 70%, and then dividing that number by 2. 
16. Respondent's working full time to build and manage Green Pointe is 
consistent with Respondent's highest and best use, and it would be adverse 
to the parties' interests and the best interests of the parties' minor children 
if Respondent were to quit working to build Green Pointe and go work 
somewhere else. That is true in principle part because of the three lawn 
care companies in Utah who are capable of hiring a manager and paying 
that manager the amount of income the Court finds should be imputed to 
Respondent, those companies being Lawnlife Corporation, Permagreen, 
and Chemlawn, Respondent has no ability to work for Lawnlife 
Corporation or Permagreen (having already worked for the same and been 
involuntarily terminated by both companies) and Chemlawn has'a 
reputation for churning its managers every few years. 
17. According to Respondent's earning capability expert, Dr. Kristie 
Farnsworth, there were no job openings available in Utah for managers of 
lawn care companies at the time of trial. 
18. According to Respondent's earnings capability expert, Dr. Kristie 
Farnsworth, managers of lawn care companies in Utah only earn between 
$15,600 and $27,700, with $24,800 being the median income level. 
19. According to Petitioner's earnings capability expert, Dr. Dennis Phillips, 
there was a reasonable likelihood that Respondent could find work as a 
manager of a lawn care company in Utah "within a reasonable time," 
which he defined as "sometime within the next two years." 
20. According to the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings 
capability expert, Petitioner, given her current educational status and job 
skills, has the current potential of earning at least $13,520 per year (the 
annual income range for immediate available jobs with Petitioner's 
educational status and job skills was $13,520 to $18,720). Thus, 
according to the undisputed testimony of Respondent's earnings capability 
expert, Petitioner is currently, and immediately, capable of earning greater 
than minimum wage. 
21. Included in the current balances of Petitioner's certificates of deposit 
(account no's 076 999-264-0296 for $22,155.13 and 076 155 224 2866 for 
$34,860.98), are the remaining proceeds of the $40,000 in joint marital 
funds that Petitioner unilaterally removed from the Parties' joint checking 
account at America First Credit Union in October of 1994 and certain gifts 
of cash received by Petitioner from her father, Herald Hammond, which 
remaining joint marital cash and gift monies were co-mingled together in 
said certificates of deposit, and from which certificates of deposit, 
Petitioner continued to pay joint marital and household obligations. 
Objection to the Form of the Proposed Divorce Decree. To the extent the form of the 
proposed Divorce Decree is inconsistent with the findings of fact and conclusions of law 
that would be entered by the Court consistent with this objection, Respondent objects to 
the form thereto. That objection is supported by the foregoing points and authorities, 
which are incorporated here. By way of additional notes, (1) Section 9(a) is duplicative 
of Section 9(e); (2) Respondent's alimony obligation in Section 5 should end upon the 
earliest to occur of Petitioner's death, remarriage or cohabitation, or the expiration of 26 
years from the date of the Divorce Decree; (3) the health insurance provision should 
reflect the statutory requirements which, in its current form, it does not, and (4) Petitioner 
is supposed to pay the costs of the proposed refinance. 
SUMMARY 
For the foregoing reasons, Respondent respectfully submits his Objection to Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law and the form of the Divorce Decree, and requests that the Court 
enter Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, and also a Divorce Decree, consistent with this 
Objection. 
DATED this Ik day of February, 1999. 
Davbi'W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Responded 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the )V day of February, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
\v DATED this W day of February, 1999. 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175) 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677) 
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
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Respondent. Judge David S. Young 
Respondent Dennis D. Linnell respectfully objects to the proposed Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law submitted by Petitioner in this matter as the same in certain respects is 
inconsistent with the Court's findings and conclusions, and in other respects is a selective and 
incomplete recitation of the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Respondent also 
objects to the form of the proposed Divorce Decree to the extent it is inconsistent with the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law that would result if the Court granted Respondent all of 
the changes it has requested in and to the Findings and Fact and Conclusions of Law and entered 
a Divorce Decree consistent therewith. 
This Objection and Motion is supported by a Memorandum of Points and Authorities in 
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support hereof. 
DATED this ]£_ day of February, 1999. 
DAVIETW. STEFFENSEN, P.C. 
David W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Resp 
CERTIFICATE OF xMAILING 
I hereby certify that on the yfl day of February, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
y DATED this W day of February, 1999. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
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vs. 




Case No: 974903252 DA 
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Plaintiff(s): CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL 
Plaintiff's Attorney(s): HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
Defendant's Attorney(s): DAVID W STEFFENSEN 
Video 
Tape Number: 041699 Tape Count: 8:52-9:24 
HEARING 
This matter comes now before the Court on respondent's objections 
to proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law and decree of 
divorce; and on petitioner's opposition to respondent's objections. 
Arguments are heard re objections and the Court states rulings for 
the record. 
Mr. Christensen to prepare findings and decree consistent with the 
Court's rulings today and submit to the Court for signature. 
Page 1 (last) 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third JuHicei District 
HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (A0638) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Petitioner, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
vs. 
No. 974903252 
DENNIS D. LINNELL, 
Judge David S. Young 
Respondent. 
The above-entitled case was tried before Judge David S. 
Young on December 17, 18 and 21, 1998. Petitioner appeared 
personally and was represented by and through counsel, Harold G. 
Christensen and Heather S. White. Respondent appeared personally 
and was represented by and through counsel, Robert M. McDonald 
and David W. Steffensen. The Court heard evidence, received 
exhibits and listened to the arguments of counsel. Being fully 
^a. 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Deputy Clerk 
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informed and for good cause appearing, the Court makes and enters 
the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner and Respondent are, and for more than three 
months immediately prior to the filing of this complaint have 
been, residents of Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
2. Petitioner and Respondent were married on August 23, 
1972. 
3. There are seven children born as issue of this 
marriage: Heather, born February 17, 1973; James Tyler, born 
September 2, 1976; John, born February 23, 1981; Sarah, born July 
2, 1985; Emily, born November 29, 1987; Kara, born October 17, 
1989; and Maryjane, born January 7, 1993. 
4. Petitioner and Respondent have irreconcilable 
differences in their marriage which have made continuation of the 
marriage impossible. Petitioner should be granted a decree of 
divorce from Respondent on those grounds effective December 21, 
1998. 
5. During the course of the marriage, Petitioner has been 
the primary caretaker of the Parties' seven children. The 
Parties do not dispute that Petitioner should be awarded sole 
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physical custody of the five minor children or that the Parties 
should be awarded joint legal custody. Petitioner is a fit and 
proper person to be awarded sole physical custody of the Parties' 
five minor children. It is in the best interests of the minor 
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home. 
6. Respondent has historically been employed in the lawn 
care industry. He managed a lawn care business from 1984 through 
January of 1995. From February of 1995 through 1996, Respondent 
operated a lawn care consulting business. 
7. From 1993 through 1996, the tax returns of the Parties 
report total income as follows: 
a. 1993 - $169,277 
b. 1994 - $155,505 
C. 1995 - $ 49,604 
d. 1996 - $ 37,377 
8. After he was terminated from employment as manager of 
the lawn care company and lost his main account as a lawn care 
consultant, Respondent voluntarily decided to go into the lawn 
care business for himself. Respondent discussed his career 
change with Petitioner and she agreed to support him in his 
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decision. In 1997, Respondent formed Green Pointe Lawn Care, 
Inc. 
9. During 1997 and 1998, Respondent devoted his full time 
and efforts into building Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. and, as a 
result, has not maintained employment elsewhere. 
10. An individual the same age as Respondent with the same 
abilities, work experience and background should be able to earn 
between $30,000 and $50,000 per year as manager of a lawn care 
business in Utah. Employment of this kind and at this income 
level is available in Utah and should be obtained within a 
reasonable period of time of searching. 
11. Respondent, himself, has acknowledged his ability to 
earn $35,000 per year. 
12. In 1998, Green Pointe Lawn Care, Inc. paid Respondent a 
salary of $14,227.31. As of December 17, 1998, the company had 
cash available for distribution to the owners in the amount of 
$38,246.10. Respondent's half interest is $19,123.05. Based 
upon those figures, Respondent could have received gross income 
of $33,350.36, or $2,779.20 per month, in 1998. 
13. Respondent is currently not earning the amount of 
income he has historically earned or is capable of earning. The 
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Court finds that Respondent is voluntarily underemployed and that 
income in the amount of $40,000.00 per year should be imputed to 
him. 
14. Until recently, Petitioner had no formal education 
beyond high school. Petitioner was employed outside of the home 
on a limited basis at the beginning of the marriage. However, 
the Parties later jointly and voluntarily agreed that Petitioner 
would not work outside of the home. Petitioner has stayed at 
home full time since then. 
15. Petitioner is enrolled as a full-time student at Salt 
Lake Community College. However, she earns $325 per month by-
renting a room in the family home to a college student. 
16. Although Petitioner currently suffers from a 
hyperthyroid condition, she is able-bodied and physically capable 
of working outside of the home. However, Petitioner has very few 
marketable skills and is only qualified to earn minimum wage. 
17. Income in the amount of $11,100.00 per year should be 
imputed to Petitioner while she pursues her education. The 
$3,900.00 income Petitioner earns per year for the roomer should 
be also be imputed to Petitioner. The total amount of income 
imputed to Petitioner should be $15,000.00 per year. 
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18. Although during the marriage, Petitioner's father made 
significant gifts to support the family, there is no evidence 
that those gifts will continue in the future nor is it her 
father's obligation to support the family. 
19. In 1994, the Parties contemplated obtaining a divorce. 
Prior to that time, Respondent gave his compensation checks to 
Petitioner for deposit in their joint account. In 1994, the 
Parties each opened and maintained separate accounts and 
Respondent closed their joint account. 
20. Petitioner transferred $40,000 of the $60,000 savings 
the Parties had accumulated and placed it into two certificates 
of deposit with First Security Bank: account # 076 999 264 0296 
and account # 076 155 224 2866. Respondent took the remaining 
$20,000. 
21. Respondent paid some of the household expenses but 
provided no funds for food or certain other expenses for the 
family. Petitioner paid the monthly expenses that Respondent did 
not pay from the First Security certificate of deposit accounts. 
The remaining balance in account # 076 999 264 0296 is 




22. The $60,000 savings was the joint property of the 
Parties and should have been divided equally. Therefore, 
Petitioner should be required to pay Respondent $10,000 from 
account # 076 999 264 0296 to compensate for the $20,000 
difference in what Petitioner kept and what she gave to 
Respondent. The money in Petitioners' certificate of deposit 
accounts has, since the initial division, remained the separate 
property of Petitioner and has not been commingled with any of 
Respondent's money. Therefore, the remaining $12,155.13 in 
account # 076 999 264 0296 as well as the $34,860.98 in account # 
076 155 224 2866 should remain the sole and separate property of 
Petitioner. 
23. The Parties have accumulated household furnishings 
valued at approximately $25,000.00, which they should divide 
equally among themselves with the items used primarily by the 
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home for the 
children's use. 
24. Respondent has $1,135.00 in his personal checking 
account, which is a marital asset and should be awarded to him. 
25. Respondent has $1,322.00 in his money market account, 
which is a marital asset and should be awarded to him. 
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26. Respondent has $5,708.27 in his America First Credit 
Union checking account, which is a marital asset and should be 
awarded to should be awarded to him. 
27. Petitioner has $2,000.00 in her First Security Bank 
savings account, which is a marital asset and should be awarded 
to her. 
28. The Parties have a 50% interest in a boat valued at 
$3,000.00. The 50% interest, equal to $1,500.00, should be 
awarded to Respondent. 
29. Respondent has a 1993 Toyota worth $9,000.00, which 
should be awarded to him. Respondent should also be responsible 
for the $1,014.00 liability on the vehicle. 
30. The Parties have a family home located on 2988 Kempner 
Road. The Parties purchased the home in 1988 and have lived 
there with their family for over ten years. The majority of the 
Parties' five minor children have never lived in any other home. 
The family home has a fair market value of $380,000.00 and 
liabilities of $58, 853(a mortgage of $41,853.00; property tax 
liens of $4,000.00; and a personal loan from Petitioner's father 
of $13,000.00). The Parties' net equity in the family home is 
$321,147. 
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31. Petitioner should be awarded the family home and be 
required to refinance the mortgage to enable her to pay 
Respondent the sum of $100,000. Petitioner should be responsible 
for the mortgage on the home, the property tax liens and the 
personal loan from Petitioner's father. Petitioner should also 
be responsible for obtaining Respondent's discharge from all 
liabilities on the home. 
32. If Petitioner is not able to obtain a refinancing loan, 
the issues relating to the division of marital property and 
liabilities should be subject to review without a showing of a 
change of circumstances. 
33. It is in the best interests of the children that 
Petitioner be awarded the family home. If Petitioner were 
required to sell the family home, she would not be able to find 
suitable housing for herself and the Parties' five minor children 
with the net proceeds available. Moreover, awarding Petitioner 
the family home will cause the least amount of disruption to the 
children's lives. 
34. Petitioner has $16,041.33 in her American Funds Group 
IRA account, which should be awarded to her. 
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35. Respondent has $25,903.00 in his American Funds Group 
IRA account, which should be awarded to him. 
36. Respondent has a $457.00 equity in his Southland 
Insurance policy, which should be awarded to him. 
37. Respondent has a $5,608.00 equity in his Reliastar 
Insurance policy, which should be awarded to him. 
38. Petitioner has credit card debt of $1,264.39, for which 
she should be responsible. 
39. Respondent has credit card debt of $1,000.00, for which 
he should be responsible. 
40. In 1997, Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. had a customer base of 
312 customers. In 1998, the company's customer base more than 
doubled to 700 customers. In 1997, Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. had 
gross revenues of $45,498.87. In 1998, the company's gross 
revenues more than doubled to $119,323.52. It is reasonable to 
assume that Green Pointe Lawn Co., Inc. will continue to grow in 
the future, although not at the same rate it has previously 
experienced. The Parties' 50% interest Green Pointe Lawn Care, 
Inc., is currently worth not less than $35,800.00 and will likely 
be worth more in the future. Respondent objects to Petitioner 
being awarded any interest in the business and the entire 50% 
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interest in Green Pointe Lawn, Inc. should be awarded to 
Respondent. 
41. The Parties have five minor children they are entitled 
to claim as dependents on their yearly tax returns. The Parties 
should each be awarded the right to claim half of the minor 
children as dependents on their tax returns each year. In years 
where there are an odd number of minor children, the Parties 
should be required to alternate yearly who is entitled to claim 
the greater number of dependents. 
42. The Respondent has maintained and paid for health 
insurance benefits for the Petitioner and the Parties' five minor 
children through his employment. The Respondent should be 
required to maintain and pay for the same health insurance 
benefits for the Parties' five children. Petitioner should be 
awarded the right to continue as an insured under the Defendant's 
health and medical insurance policy in effect through his 
employer, provided however, she shall be responsible for any 
premium charges associated therewith. In the event that the 
health insurance benefits do not cover any of the medical 
expenses of the Parties' five minor children, the Parties should 
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be required to share equally the responsibility for those 
expenses. 
43. Petitioner's reasonable monthly expenses total 
$2,486.00. Those expenses are more particularly set forth as 
follows: 
a. Mortgage payment (prior to $100,000.00 second 
mortgage - $626.00 
b. House taxes - $160.00 
c. Homeowner's insurance - $50.00 
d. Utilities - $250.00 
e. Car taxes - $10.00 
f. Car insurance - $50.00 
g. Gas - $140.00 
h. Food - $800.00 
i. Clothes - $100.00 
j. Miscellaneous - $300.00 
44. Respondent's reasonable monthly expenses total $949. 
Those expenses are more particularly set forth as follows: 
a. Rent - $200 
b. Utilities - $40 
c. Telephone - $19 
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d. Medical and Dental - $40 
e. Car Payment - $155 
f. Car Insurance - $50 
g. Car Taxes - $40 
h. Gas - $150 
i. Food - $150 
j. Clothing - $40 
k. Laundry & Cleaning - $3 0 
1. Miscellaneous - $35 
45. Based upon the calculations of the Child Support 
Obligation Worksheet, Respondent is required to pay Petitioner 
$1,069.00 per month in child support. 
46. Petitioner should be awarded $1,100.00 per month 
permanent alimony for a period not to exceed the length of the 
marriage or until terminated by operation of law. Based upon 
Petitioner's imputed income, Respondent's imputed income and both 
Petitioner's and Respondent's reasonable expenses, alimony of 
$1,100 per month is a reasonable amount. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. To the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact are also 
Conclusions of Law, the same are adopted herein in all respects. 
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2. Each of the parties should be required to execute and 
deliver to the other, such deeds, assignment, conveyances and 
bills of sale as each may request from time to time with respect 
to the assets awarded to the respective parties, including those 
assets which the Court has found and determined to be separate 
properties from the marital estate. 
3. Each of the parties should assume, pay, discharge and 
hold the other harmless from any and all obligations after the 
separation of the Parties. 
4. Each of the parties should bear the responsibility for 
their individual costs and attorney's fees. 
5. The Decree of Divorce should be effective December 21, 
1998. 
Approved as to form: 
David W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Respondent 
N: \l9497\l\PIND5eCON. WPD 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Gloriann Egan, says that she is employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for Petitioner Carolyn Hammond Linnell; that she served the attached 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW (Case Number 974903252, Third 
Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah) upon the party listed below by placing 
a true and correct copy thereof in an envelope addressed to: 
David W. Steffensen 
Steffensen McDonald Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
7 *" 




HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN (A0638) 
RODNEY R. PARKER (A4110) 
HEATHER S. WHITE (A7674) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial Patriot 
MAY 2 0 1389 
SALT LAKE CCJN1Y 
Deputy Clerk 
DATE 
ENTERED IN REGISTRY 
OF JUDGMENTS 
7 - 34 ( *[Q[ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
Petitioner, 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
vs. No. 974903252 
DENNIS D. LINNELL, Judge David S. Young 
Respondent 
The above-entitled case was tried before Judge David S. 
Young on December 17, 18 and 21, 1998. Petitioner appeared 
personally and was represented by and through counsel, Harold G. 
Christensen and Heather S. White. Respondent appeared personally 
and was represented by and through counsel, Robert M. McDonald 
and David W. Steffensen. The Court heard evidence, received 
exhibits and listened to the arguments of counsel. Being fully 
informed, having made and entered the foregoing Findings of Fact 
and Conclusion of Law, and for good cause appearing, the Court 
ORDERS as follows: 
1. Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded a divorce 
from Respondent on the grounds of irreconcilable differences, 
effective December 21, 1998; 
2. Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded sole 
physical custody of the Parties' five minor children; 
3. The Parties should be and hereby are awarded joint 
legal custody of the Parties' five minor children; 
4. Respondent should be and hereby is granted liberal but 
reasonable rights of visitation with the Parties' five minor 
children; 
5. Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded alimony in 
the amount of $1,100.00 per month for a period not to exceed the 
length of the marriage or until terminated by operation of law, 
one-half payable on the fifth (5th) day of each month and the 
remaining half payable on the twentieth (20th) day of each month, 
commencing January 5, 1999; 
6. Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded $1,069.00 
per month in child support, one-half payable on the fifth (5th) 
2 
day of each month and the remaining half payable on the twentieth 
(20th) day of each month, commencing January 5, 1999; 
7. Petitioner should be and hereby is awarded as her sole 
and separate property, without claim from Respondent, the 
following: 
a. Petitioner's First Security Bank savings account 
worth $2,000; 
b. $12,155.13 of Petitioner's First Security Bank 
certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296; 
c. Petitioner's First Security Bank certificate of 
deposit, account # 076 155 224 2866, worth $34,860.98; 
d. The family home located on 2988 Kempner Road 
having a fair market value of $380,000; 
e. Petitioner's American Funds Group IRA account 
worth $16,041.33; 
8. Petitioner should be and hereby is responsible for the 
following liabilities: 
a. The mortgage on the family home; 
b. Property tax liens on the home in the amount of 
$4,000; 
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c* A personal loan from Petitioner's father on the 
family home in the amount of $13,000; 
d. Petitioner's credit card debt of $1,264.39; 
9. Respondent should be and hereby is awarded as his sole 
and separate property, without claim from Petitioner, the 
following: 
a. $10,000 from Petitioner's First Security Bank 
certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296; 
b. Respondent's personal checking account worth 
$1,135; 
c. Respondent's money market account worth $1,322; 
d. Respondent's America First Credit Union checking 
account worth $5,70 8.27; 
e. $10,000 of Petitioner's First Security Bank 
certificate of deposit, account # 076 999 264 0296; 
f. The Parties' 50% interest in a boat, worth $1,500; 
g. 1993 Toyota worth $9,000; 
h. Respondent's American Funds Group IRA account 
worth $25,903; 
i. Respondent's $457 equity in his Southland 
Insurance policy; 
j. Respondent's $5,608 equity in his Reliastar 
Insurance policy; 
k. Respondent's entire 50% interest in Green Pointe 
Lawn Care, Inc. presently worth not less than $35,800; 
10. Respondent should be and hereby is responsible for the 
following liabilities: 
a. Liability on the 1993 Toyota in the amount of 
$1,014; 
b. Respondent's credit card debt of $1,000; 
11. The Parties should be and hereby are required to divide 
equally the $25,000 worth of household furnishings they have 
acquired during the marriage with the items used primarily by the 
children to remain with Petitioner in the family home for the 
children's use; 
12. The Parties should be and hereby are awarded the right 
to claim half of the minor children as dependents on their tax 
returns each year. In years where there are an odd number of 
minor children, the Parties are required to alternate yearly who 
is entitled to claim the greater number of dependents, beginning 
with Petitioner for the tax year 1998; 
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13. The Respondent should be and hereby is required to 
maintain and pay for the same health insurance benefits for the 
Parties' five children that the Respondent has previously 
maintained through his employment. Petitioner should be and 
hereby is awarded the right to continue as an insured under the 
Defendant's health and medical insurance policy in effect through 
his employer, provided however, she shall be responsible for any 
premium charges associated therewith. In the event that the 
health insurance benefits do not cover any of the medical 
expenses of the Parties' five minor children, the Parties should 
be and hereby are required to share equally the responsibility 
for those expenses; 
14. Petitioner should be and hereby is required to 
refinance the family home, pay Respondent the sum of $100,000 and 
discharge Respondent from all liabilities on the family home; 
15. If Petitioner is not able to obtain a refinancing loan, 
the issues relating to the division of marital property and 
liabilities shall be subject to review without a showing of a 
change of circumstances; 
16. The Parties should be and hereby are required to pay 
their own costs and attorney's fees. 
6 
DATED this *lp day of J&BT 1999. 
Approved as to form: 
BY THE COURT: 
DAVID S. Yi 
District C 
David W. Steffensen 
Attorney for Respondent 
N \19497\1\DIVDBCRE WPD 
7 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Gloriann Egan, says that she is employed by the law offices of Snow, Christensen & 
Martineau, attorneys for Petitioner Carolyn Hammond Linnell; that she served the attached 
DECREE OF DIVORCE (Case Number 974903252, Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah) upon the party listed below by placing a true and correct copy thereof in 
an envelope addressed to: 
David W. Steffensen 
Steffensen McDonald Steffensen 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
SaJt Lake City, Utah 84106 
and causing the same to be hand delivered on the *- ' day of April, 1999. 
N\19497\1\MAILCRT13 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175) 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677) 
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL 
Petitioner, MOTION TO AMEND FINDINGS OF 
FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE 
OF DIVORCE 
v. 
DENNIS D. LINNELL Case No. 974903252 
Respondent. Judge David S. Young 
Pursuant to Rules 52 and 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Respondent Dennis D. 
Linnell respectfully moves the Court to amend the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce entered by the Court on May 20, 1999. More particularly, Respondent moves 
the Court as follows: 
a. Respondent moves to amend Findings of Fact Nos. 12,13,16,17,20-22, 
31,33,40,42,45,46; 
b. Respondent moves to amend Conclusions of Law No. 1 to the extent the 
Findings constitute conclusions of law; 
c. Respondent moves the Court to amend the Decree of Divorce dated on or 
about May 20,1999 and /or direct the entry of a new Decree of Divorce 
consistent with the amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and 
legal authorities cited in the Memorandum in support of this Motion; and 
d. In the alternative, to the extent necessary to bring the matter to a just 
conclusion, Respondent moves the Court for a new trial and an Order 
opening the Decree of Divorce and, to the extent the Court deems 
necessary take additional evidence and/or testimony and direct entry of a 
new Decree of Divorce. 
The grounds for the Motion are as follows: (a) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Divorce Decree; (b) the Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law and Divorce Decree are against law; (c) the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Divorce Decree constitute an error in law. 
This Motion is supported by a Motion of even date. 
DATED this _ 2 > day of May, 1999. 
DAVID W. STEFFENASEN, P.C. 
DaWw. Steffensen 
Attorney for Respon 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the P day of June, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce, and 
Memorandum of Points and Authorities in support thereof, to be mailed, postage prepaid, and 
addressed to the following: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this J day of June, 1999. 
ROBERT M. MCDONALD, P.C. (A2175) 
DAVID W. STEFFENSEN, P.C. (A4677) 
STEFFENSEN MCDONALD STEFFENSEN 
Attorneys for Respondent 
2159 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Telephone: (801) 485-1818 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
DENNIS D. LINNELL, 
Respondent. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION TO AMEND 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF 
LAW, AND DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Case No. 974903252 
Judge David S. Young 
Respondent Dennis D. Linnell submits this memorandum in support of Respondent's Motion to 
Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. This case was tried before the Honorable David S. Young on December 17, 18, and 21, 1998. 
Pursuant to the Court's instruction, Petitioner submitted to Respondent's counsel proposed 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. 
2. Because Respondent's counsel had objections to the proposed findings and decree, on February 
16, 1999, Respondent filed his Objection to Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, and Objection to Form of Proposed Decree of Divorce, and Memorandum in Support 
^M 23 p/f /•'55 
thereof. Petitioner filed her Memorandum in Opposition to Respondent's Objection on March 
1, 1999. 
The Court heard oral argument on Respondent's Objection on April 16,1999 and made rulings 
that were incorporated into the final version of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Decree of Divorce that were entered by the Court on May 20, 1999. 
The present motion focuses on findings of fact entered by the Court that are not supported by 
the evidence, are in error, or are against applicable law. The present motion seeks amendment 
of the following findings of fact. 
Finding No. 12. The amount of cash found to be available for distribution in Finding No. 12 
is wrong. For the purpose of imputing income to Respondent, the finding states: "As of 
December 17, 1998, the company had cash available for distribution to the owners in the 
amount of $38,246.10. Respondent's half interest is $19,123.05. Based upon those figures, 
Respondent could have received gross income of $33,350.36, or $2,779,20 per month, in 
1998." That statement is not supported by the evidence at trial; Green Pointe's cash on hand 
as of the trial date was $36,085.44, and not $38,246.10. The $36,085.44 number reflects Green 
Pointe's uncollected accounts receivable which may not even be collectable. The undisputed 
testimony of the Respondent and his CPA expert was that the $36,085.44 in company cash was 
not available for distribution, but rather was needed to pay the company's approximately 
$9,000 per month in expenditures to keep the company operating in its "down" months, to hire 
a new worker, and to buy another truck to facilitate the company's growth. In this regard, the 
Court seems to rely on the assumption that the company is going to continue growing, yet the 
Court found that the company's cash, which was needed to fund an additional truck and 
employee to facilitate that growth, should not be applied to that purpose but should be 
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distributed to the shareholders instead. Either the company grows and has no cash available 
for distribution, or the company has cash available for distribution and does not grow. It cannot 
be both ways. 
6. Finding No. 13. Finding No. 13 finds that "Respondent is currently not earning the amount 
of income he has historically earned or is capable of earning," and finds that "Respondent is 
voluntarily underemployed and that income in the amount of $40,000.00 per year should be 
imputed to him." That finding is contrary to the undisputed evidence at trial. Pertinent material 
facts established at trial are as follows: a) that Respondent was gainfully employed on a full-
time basis for Green Pointe, a lawncare start-up company, in work which constituted his 
historical highest and best use; b) Green Pointe was formed by Respondent and his 50% 
partner, Steve Nicholaides, long before the parties separated or Petitioner filed for divorce; c) 
Respondent started Green Pointe only after discussing the startup with Petitioner and obtaining 
her support for his doing so. Respondent's purpose in starting Green Pointe was to do what 
was in the best long term economic interest of his family taking into consideration his lack of 
any schooling beyond high school, lack of meaningful experience in any job or industry other 
than lawn care, and substantial experience and success in building and running a lawn care 
company in the past; and d) despite Respondent's and Mr. Nicholaides' full time efforts in 
building the business of Green Pointe, the business of Green Pointe was not sufficiently 
developed or established to pay Respondent or Mr. Nicholaides any income between the 
company's start date in February of 1997 and May of 1998, when Green Pointe first had 
sufficient revenues to fund salary payments to those gentlemen. From May 1998 and 
continuing until the date of trial, Green Pointe paid Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides salaries 
that Green Pointe's business volume and cash flow could afford, approximately $14,000 each 
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(approximately $1,500 per month each). Notwithstanding Green Pointe's paying no salaries 
to Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides in 1997, Green Pointe suffered a net loss reported on the 
company's tax return of $4,495. With paying salaries of approximately $14,000 each to 
Respondent and Mr. Nicholaides in 1998, Green Pointe suffered a net loss through the date of 
trial of $1,146.35. While Petitioner's earnings capability expert testified that Respondent could 
find a management job for a lawn care company in Utah that would pay between $30,000 and 
$50,000 within a "reasonable time," that expert's own definition of "a reasonable time," 
namely, "sometime within the next two years," suggests that any imputation of income would 
have to be discounted below the $30,000 range given for the time delay in getting a job. For 
the Court to impute income at $40,000 anyway, is not supported by the clear implication of the 
testimony of Petitioner's own expert that he was aware of no such jobs being currently 
available in Utah and it could take Respondent two years to find such a job earning between 
$30,000 and $50,000.l With no such jobs currently available as of the time of trial, the mere 
prospect of getting such a job sometime in the next two years simply does not support a current 
imputation of $40,000 per year. If the Court is still inclined to impute income to Respondent, 
it should do so at the level established by Respondent's expert, namely $24,800 (note, the 
income range established by expert testimony was $24,800 to $30,300). 
7. Finding No. 16. Finding No. 16 is in error because the income level imputed to Petitioner 
1
 Petitioner's expert testified that he could not name any lawn care company in the State 
of Utah, that he had talked to no lawn care company in the state of Utah, and had no idea whether 
or not any such jobs were actually available in the State of Utah at the $30,000 to $50,000 
income level he testified could be earned. Importantly, Respondent's earnings expert's report 
contained actual employment data for Utah jobs showing that no lawn care industry management 
jobs were available in Utah at the time of trial and, further, that if such a job were currently 
available, the actual Utah employment data showed the annual income range for such jobs was 
$15,600 to $27,700, with the median income being $24,800. 
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should be at least the minimum amount established by the unrefuted testimony of Respon-
dent's earnings expert—namely $13,520 (the income range established by expert testimony 
was $13,520 to $18,720 for work immediately available with no upgrades in work skills). In 
light of the fact that Petitioner presented no evidence to rebut the testimony of Respondent's 
expert, finding that Petitioner "is only qualified to earn minimum wage" is unsupported by the 
evidence and in error. 
Finding No. 17. Finding No. 17 is in error for the same reasons that Finding No. 16 is in 
error. With a correct imputation amount, the total amount of income imputed should be no less 
than $17,420. 
Finding Nos. 20-22. Findings Nos. 20 through 22 are in error because they imply that the 
$10,000 payment from Petitioner to Respondent "equalizes" the division of the parties' 
$65,000 in cash assets. In this regard, the evidence at trial was: a) that in October 1994, 
Petitioner took most of the cash, ($40,000 of the $65,000); b) after Petitioner took most of the 
cash, she only paid for family food and gas for her car, thus expending only small portions of 
those monies, while Respondent paid virtually all of the family's expenses with the $25,000 
that was not taken; c) the result of the disparate spending was that by the time of the trial of 
this matter, Petitioner had almost $57,000 left in cash ($22,155.13 plus $34,860.98) whereas 
Respondent had only $7,000 left in cash (the $1,322 in his money market account and the 
$5,708.27 in his America First Credit Union checking account). In "equalizing" that cash, what 
the Court should do is divide the cash on the basis of ending cash balances as of the time of 
trial on December 21, 1998, and not as of October 1994. The Court divided the cash as of 
October 1994 based solely upon Petitioner's self serving statement (which was disputed by 
Respondent) that Petitioner was contemplating a divorce in October 1994. Yet Petitioner did 
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not file for divorce until July 31, 1997, and the parties did not separate until approximately 
November of 1997. From October 1994 through November 1997 and continuing until the time 
of trial, Respondent used the $25,000 in marital cash assets in his accounts to support the 
family (thus reducing the balance thereof to $7,000 at the time of trial) whereas Petitioner 
essentially saved all of her marital cash (thus leaving almost $57,000 in her accounts at the 
time of trial). 
Finding No. 31 . Finding No. 31 is in error because it states that only $100,000 in the equity 
of the Parties' home on 2988 Kempner Road need be paid to Respondent by Petitioner out of 
a refinancing by Petitioner on the home because a $100,000 cash payment, when combined 
with the overall division and distribution of the parties' marital assets, does not fairly or 
equitably divide the parties' marital assets. In this regard, the $100,000 payment was the "plug" 
number the Court determined was necessary to render the overall property division equitable. 
With the $100,000 payment, the division of assets found by the Court in fact is not equitable, 
but rather results in $312,440 being awarded to Petitioner and $191,919 being awarded to 
Respondent (See attached "Exhibit 1" Property Division Summary). As sole support for 
finding that this grossly unequal division of the parties' marital assets is "equitable," the Court 
expressed its opinion that Respondent would be able to bring about the future growth of Green 
Pointe to make up the difference. Reliance upon the future growth of is an erroneous basis for 
rendering an otherwise unequal property division equitable. 
Finding 33. Finding No. 33 finds that it is in the best interests of the children that Petitioner 
be awarded the family home and that Petitioner, if required to sell the family home, would not 
be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' five minor children with the net 
proceeds available. This finding is in error because Respondent's real estate expert, Veda 
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Barrie, was prepared to testify to the existence of numerous homes in the immediate 
neighborhood that Petitioner could buy with her share of the net proceeds from the sale of the 
parties' home, which would involve the children going to all of the same schools. Hence, there 
would be no disruption to the children whatsoever. When the Court ruled that all such 
testimony was irrelevant, Respondent made a proffer of what his real estate expert's testimony 
would be. The Court erred in not allowing that testimony, and it erred in finding that Petitioner 
would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' children with the net 
proceeds. Moreover, the finding ignores the economic reality established at trial that the parties 
cannot afford to allow Respondent an acceptable standard of living and also keep Petitioner 
in the parties' $380,000 home. The undisputed testimony at trial was that the financial stresses 
resulting from Respondent's being forced to bear financial obligations beyond his means to 
keep the children in the family home would far outweigh the non-disruption benefit to the 
children in staying in the home. Accordingly, the finding is not supported by the evidence and 
its entry, in the face of the Court's refusal to hear and consider the proffered testimony of 
Respondent's real estate expert, is in error. 
Finding No. 40. Finding No. 40 is in error because the Court focused upon and emphasized 
the dramatic growth in the business volume of Green Pointe and found that Green Pointe "will 
continue to grow in the future." It is obvious from the unequal nature of the Court's division 
of the parties' marital assets combined with the Court's conclusion that such property division 
is "equitable," that the Court is relying on the future growth of the Green Pointe business 
interest to make the parties' asset division equitable (The Court's finding that the value of the 
Green Pointe business interest is worth not less than $35,800.00 and will likely be worth more 
in the future," underlines Respondent's point.). For the same reasons that Finding No. 31 is in 
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error, Finding No. 40 is in error. 
13. Finding No. 42. Finding No. 42 is in error because it did not hold that each parent is to share 
equally in the out-of-pocket costs of health insurance premiums. Rather, the finding 
erroneously holds that "[tjhe Respondent should be required to maintain and pay for the same 
health insurance benefits for the Parties' five children." 
14. Finding No. 45. Finding No. 45 is in error because the income imputed to respondent was 
in error; therefore, the child support, calculated using that imputed income, is necessarily 
excessive and wrong. 
15. Finding No. 46. Finding No. 46 is in error because the Court incorrectly calculated alimony 
to be awarded to Petitioner. 
ARGUMENT 
I. Introduction. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides a basis for a party to request that the court 
amend its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce. Rule 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in conjunction with Rule 52. a basis for a party to move the Court 
for a new trial and open the judgment in the event of "insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law," or is an "error in law." The evidence discussed 
above provides ample basis for amending the Findings. Moreover, there is insufficient evidence to 
justify the Court's rulings, and such rulings are contrary to Utah law. Therefore, the Court should 
amend its findings, or grant Respondent a new trial. 
II. Finding No. 12. 
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 12 on the ground that, as discussed above in paragraph 5 
above, the amount of cash stated to be available is factually incorrect and such cash is not available 
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for distribution under Utah law. Under Utah law, the company cash could not be "available" for 
distribution to its shareholders at the time of trial. With the undisputed testimony that Green Pointe 
had liabilities in excess of assets as of the time of trial (see Green Pointe Balance Sheet introduced 
into evidence at trial), Green Pointe's cash could not be available for distribution under Utah Code 
Ann. §12-10a-640(3), which states that "no distribution [to shareholders] may be made if, after 
giving it effect: (a) the corporation would not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the usual 
course of business; or (b) the corporation's total assets would be less than the sum of its total 
liabilities...." A distribution of the $36,085.44 in Green Pointe's cash to its shareholders at the time 
of trial would, under that section and §§16-10a-840 and 16-10a-841 be an "unlawful distribution" 
for which the directors participating in such distribution could be personally surcharged. If the 
distribution would be illegal under applicable Utah law, which on the present facts, it would be, then 
Green Pointe's cash cannot, as a matter of law, be "available" for distribution in such a way that it 
can be added to Respondent's income in an effort to support income imputation.2 
III. Finding No. 13. 
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 13 on the ground that it is not supported by the evidence 
2
 The purpose of the statutory rule is to ensure that a corporation makes no distributions 
of assets to shareholders without first assuring that the corporation has sufficient assets for the 
payment of its creditors. That statutory provision protects against the use of corporate shells for 
perpetrating fraud on persons that do business with corporations. It should be noted in this regard 
that in January of 1999, Green Pointe, in response to heavy pressure and a threat of litigation 
from Herald Hammond, the Petitioner's father and a creditor of Green Pointe, paid Mr. 
Hammond $25,000 of Green Pointe's $36,000 cash on hand to reduce his loan to the company 
from $48,000 to $23,000, and Green Pointe executed and delivered to Mr. Hammond a 
promissory note for the $23,000 balance payable with interest over the next five years. If Green 
Pointe would have distributed its $36,000 in cash to its shareholders, then Green Pointe would 
not have had sufficient funds to pay Mr. Hammond. If Green Pointe had in fact distributed the 
$36,000 to its shareholders as the Court implied Green Pointe was able to do, and if Green Pointe 
had immediately thereafter ceased doing business, Mr. Hammond and the other creditors of 
Green Pointe would have been left holding an empty bag. 
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at trial and is an error in law. As discussed above in paragraph 6 above, the evidence introduced at 
trial does not support the income imputed to the Respondent. Income imputation on such facts is 
clearly inappropriate under Utah law. In Griffith v. Griffith, 959 P.2d 1015 (Utah App. 1998), the 
Utah Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's refusal to impute a husband's historic side-job 
income where, "(1) husband had stopped performing the side-jobs before the couple separated and 
was unlikely to perform them again in the future; (2) husband worked fifty hours a week at a 
demanding job, and thus was not underemployed, (3) [the family business] appropriately 
compensated husband for full time work; and (4) husband's extra work was done to keep the family 
business viable and thus was not evidence of voluntary underemployment." Id. at 1018 (emphasis 
added). That ruling was consistent with "the goal of imputing income," which "is to prevent parents 
from reducing their child support or alimony by purposeful unemployment or underemployment." 
Id. 
As in Griffith, Respondent's change in work and income status in no way is a purposeful 
attempt to reduce his child support or alimony obligations. Indeed, the undisputed evidence at trial 
was that Mr. Linnell started his current full-time job at Green Pointe long before the parties' 
separation and Petitioner filed for divorce. To impute income to the Respondent, the Court would 
have to find that Respondent expended a great deal of effort and money starting Green Pointe for the 
express purpose of avoiding child support and alimony. That was not the evidence at trial, however. 
Rather, the undisputed evidence at trial was that Respondent, having lost his job at Lawnlife and also 
his only substantial consulting client thereafter, sought to do what would be in the best long term 
interests of his family—that is, start and build a lawn care company that he could control and which 
would never terminate him. Such facts, when viewed in light of Griffith, preclude any income 
imputation. Accordingly, the Court's finding that income should be imputed to Respondent is against 
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applicable law and an error in law. 
Moreover, even if the Court could impute income to Respondent, which under applicable Utah 
law the Court can not, the amount of income imputed to Respondent is not supported by the evidence 
at trial. First, as stated above, the Court's finding that Green Pointe's $36,085.44 in cash on hand as 
of the date of trial was available for distribution to its shareholders and, thus, was a basis for 
supporting income imputation of $40,000 to Respondent, is factually and legally in error. Without 
the Green Pointe cash being available for distribution, it becomes clear that the only monies available 
to Respondent through Green Pointe was the salary Green Pointe could afford and the salary he was 
being paid, which was $14,000 from May of 1998 through the date of trial ($1,500 per month). 
IV. Finding No. 16. 
As discussed in paragraphs 7 and 8 above, Respondent moves to amend Findings Nos. 16 and 17 
because the income level to be imputed to Petitioner should be at least the minimum amount 
established by the unrefuted testimony of Respondent's earnings expert, namely $13,520, and more 
properly should be $17,420. The Court's finding that Petitioner "is only qualified to earn minimum 
wage" is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, is contradicted by unrefuted evidence, and is a 
factual error. 
V. Finding Nos. 20-22. 
As discussed above in paragraph 9, Respondent moves to amend findings 20-22 to the extent that 
they imply that the $10,000 payment from Petitioner to Respondent "equalizes" the division of the 
parties' $65,000 in cash assets. The appropriate date for evaluating and dividing marital assets is 
the time of trial Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P. 2d 260,262 (Utah App. 1993); accord Dunn v. Dunn, 
801 P.2d 1314 (Utah 1990); Fletcher v. Fletcher, 615 P.2d 1218, 1222-23 (Utah 1980); Peck v. Peck, 
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah App. 1987), and not four years earlier when one or the other parties first 
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"contemplates" getting a divorce. Although trial courts have discretion to use a different date, if 
court uses a date other than the date of trial, it must support its decision with sufficiently detailed 
findings of fact explaining its deviation from the general rule. Shepherd v. Spepherd, 876 P.2d 429, 
433 (Utah App. 1994), citing Rappleye, supra at 262; Peck v. Peck, 738 P.2d 1050,1052 (Utah App. 
1987). 
In light of the case law, the Court erred in evaluating and dividing the cash as of October 1994. 
First, the Court evaluated and divided all other property as of the time of trial and only divided the 
parties' cash assets as of October 1994. Only one date can be used for the division of all assets. The 
Court's use of differing valuation dates results in an allocation of more assets to Petitioner than 
would be allocated to her if a consistent valuation date were employed. Second, the Court made no 
findings of fact in support of its deviation from the general rule (except to acknowledge Petitioner's 
self serving statement, disputed by Respondent at trial that she "contemplated getting a divorce" in 
1994, and each of the parties had use of their separated cash assets thereafter). If the cash were 
divided as Utah law requires, the total cash on hand at the time of trial of $67,181.38 would be 
divided equally between the parties so that the additional cash payment from Petitioner to 
Respondent would increase from $10,000 to $25,425.42. 
VI. Finding No. 31. 
Respondent moves to amend Finding No. 31 on the grounds that the division of assets is not 
equitable, but rather results in $312,440 being awarded to Petitioner and $191,919 being awarded 
to Respondent. See Property Division Summary attached hereto as "Exhibit 1." The overriding 
consideration in property division is "that the ultimate division be equitable—that property be fairly 
divided between the parties given their contributions during the marriage and their circumstances 
at the time of the divorce." Dunn v. Dunn, 802 P.2d 1314, 1322 (Utah App. 1990) (quoting Burt v. 
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Burt, 799 P.2d 1166,1171 (Utah App. 1990); see also Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276,1278 
(Utah 1987)). In Dunn, the Court of Appeals found that the trial court abused its discretion when it 
justified an unequal and inequitable distribution of marital property (24% to wife and 76% to 
husband) solely on the parties' economic contributions to the marriage. The Appellate Court then 
stated: 
On remand, the trial court should follow the systematic approach set forth in Burt. That is, the 
court should first properly categorize the parties' property as part of the marital estate or as the 
separate property of one or the other as set forth in this opinion. Each party is then presumed 
to be entitled to all of his or her separate property and fifty percent of the marital property. 
Burt, 799 P.2d at 1171; Maxwell v. Maxwell, 745 P.2d 84, 86-87 (Utah App. 1990) (absent 
special circumstances, property accumulated by the parties during the marriage should be 
equally divided). Id. at 1323. 
In the case at hand, the only special circumstance the Court referred to as justification for 
finding the grossly unequal division of the parties' marital assets to be "equitable," is that the Court 
thought that Respondent would be able to bring about the future growth of Green Pointe to make up 
the difference, notwithstanding the undisputed testimony at trial was that it would take three to five 
years for Green Pointe to have a sufficient business volume to pay to Respondent the $40,000 
income imputed to Respondent. The Court's reliance upon the future earnings potential and future 
value of Green Pointe is an inappropriate basis for rendering an otherwise unequal property division 
equitable, especially when the growth of that business interest is wholly dependent upon the future 
personal work and personal efforts of Respondent. See Chambers v. Chambers, 840 P.2d 841, 844 
(Utah App. 1992). 
VII. Finding No. 33. 
Respondent moves the Court to amend Finding No. 33 because it erroneously finds that it is in the 
best interests of the children that Petitioner be awarded the family home and that Petitioner, if 
required to sell the family home, would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the 
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Parties' five minor children with the net proceeds available. This finding is in error for two reasons: 
1) as indicated by Respondent's proffer of testimony of his real estate expert, there are numerous 
homes in the immediate neighborhood that Petitioner could buy with her share of the proceeds from 
the sale of the home, and the children would experience minimal disruption because they would 
attend the same schools and live in the same neighborhood close to their friends. Simply put, it was 
error to exclude such proffered testimony, especially when the Court went on to find that Petitioner 
would not be able to find suitable housing for herself and the Parties' children with the net proceeds; 
and 2) the finding ignores the fact that the parties cannot afford to keep Petitioner in the home and 
also provide Respondent with an acceptable standard of living. Accordingly, the finding is not 
supported by the evidence and its entry, in the face of the Court's refusal to hear and consider the 
proffered testimony of Respondent's real estate expert, is in error. 
VII. Finding No. 40. 
Finding No. 40 is in error for several reasons. First, the Court is relying on the future growth of 
Green Pointe to make the asset division equitable. For the reasons set forth in Section VI. above, the 
finding is contrary to Utah law and is in error. Second, in relying on the earnings of Green Pointe, 
which is essentially a personal service business, the Court erroneously doubled Respondent's 
earnings potential. In Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992), the Utah Supreme Court held 
that the good will of a professional sole practitioner, which essentially is comprised of his or her 
future earnings potential, is not a marital asset subject to division. Id. at 776-77'. In so holding, the 
Court stated: 
The combination of the degree and the practitioner's reputation enables him or her to 
earn in many cases a substantial income, the fruits of which are shared by the children 
in the form of child support and by the former spouse in the form of alimony. That is true 
in the instant case where defendant has been ordered to pay substantial amounts of child 
support and alimony which were determined in light of his earnings from his dental 
practice. Requiring defendant to divide with his wife the value of his reputation would 
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not be an "equitable division," which is required by our statute, but would constitute 
"double counting," which is condemned in property division cases. 
Id. While Respondent admittedly is not a professional, Green Pointe is a personal service business 
which is solely reliant upon Respondent's and his partner's personal services. When the Court 
awarded Petitioner alimony based upon an income level of $40,000 imputed to Respondent due to 
the Court's view of the cash available in Green Pointe and Green Pointe's earnings capacity, and 
then valued Respondent's Vi interest in Green Pointe at $35,800 based upon Green Pointe's earnings 
potential (using the formula of 70% of gross sales), the Court double counted Respondent's earnings 
capability in violation of the principles enumerated in Sorensen. Under the principles set forth in 
Sorensen, no value should be ascribed to the Green Pointe business interest. Accordingly, the finding 
is in error and against Utah law. 
VIII. Finding No. 42. 
Finding No. 42 finds that: 4The Respondent should be required to maintain and pay for the same 
health insurance benefits for the Parties' five children." This finding is in error because Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7.15(3) provides that "the order shall require each parent to share equally the out-of-
pocket costs of the premium actually paid by a parent for the children's portion of insurance." 
IX. Finding No. 45. 
As discussed above, the income imputed to Respondent is inappropriate. Therefore, the child support 
payment, which is calculated using the income imputed to Respondent, is necessarily excessive and 
wrong. 
X. Finding No. 46. 
Finding No. 46 is in error because the method of calculating alimony, and the resultant alimony 
award, violate Utah law regarding the establishment of alimony. The factors to be taken into 
consideration in establishing alimony are set forth at Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7). In Morgan v. 
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Morgan, 854 P.2d 559, 567 (Utah App,), the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed such factors, stating: 
In awarding alimony, appellate courts require the trial court to consider each of the 
following three factors: (1) the financial conditions and needs of the receiving spouse; 
(2) the ability of the receiving spouse to produce sufficient income for him or herself; 
and (3) the ability of the responding spouse to provide support, [citations omitted] 
Applied to the instant case, the Court violated the second Morgan factor when it stated that income 
at minimum wage was imputed to Petitioner solely for purposes of calculating child support and was 
not considered in calculating alimony. The Court cannot impute income to Petitioner for child 
support purposes but not for alimony purposes. If income is imputed to Petitioner, the imputed 
income should apply to both child support and alimony. When properly taking the Petitioner's 
imputed and actual income into consideration in calculating the alimony obligation as is required 
under the cases cited above, the alimony award should only be $167 per month. 
Moreover, the Court violated the third Morgan factor by not considering Respondent's 
reasonable living expenses when the Court determined Respondent's ability to pay such alimony. 
Even under the $40,000.00 imputed to the Respondent, he could not afford to pay such support 
(because $40,000/12 = $3,333 per month, less child support of $1,069, less alimony of $1,100 leaves 
only $1,164 per month before any payroll and income taxes are withheld, leaving an amount, after 
payment of required taxes, of less than $949.00 per month to pay Respondent's necessary living 
expenses). In other words, at the $40,000 income level imputed to Respondent by the Court, 
Respondent is unable to provide the ordered support. Furthermore, the $40,000 imputed income is 
a fiction. Respondent's actual income is only $1,500 per month. Thus, the $2,169 per month in 
alimony and child support payments exceed Respondent's actual income by $669 per month. 
The inequitable property division heavily skewed in favor of Petitioner, combined with the 
award to Petitioner of alimony and child support in an amount exceeding Respondent's income 
award, is patently unfair and unjust. The effect is to force Respondent to liquidate his share of the 
16 
property division to fund the excessive alimony and child support obligations. This violates the 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. §30-3-5(7) in that the Court should have exercised its authority in 
equity to equalize the parties' respective standards of living, rather than impose an alimony award 
that exacerbates and increases an already unequal standard of living. 
XI. Proposed Amendments to Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce. 
To the extent the foregoing Findings of Fact constitute conclusions of law under Rules 52 and 59(a) 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure the Respondent can and does move the Court to amend the 
findings for the reasons set forth above. To the extent the Findings of Fact are embodied in the 
Decree, under Rules 52 and 50(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Respondent can and does 
move the Court to amend the Decree and/or direct the entry of a new Decree consistent with the 
amended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and legal authorities cited above. The 
Respondent also moves the Court for a new trial and an Order opening the Decree for the purpose 
of considering additional evidence and direct entry of a new decree. 
CONCLUSION 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce discussed above are in error. 
Therefore, the Court should amend the Findings and Decree, or grant Respondent a new trial. 
DATED this Z5""dav of June, 1999. 
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 Not equal because the furnishings relating to the support of the children were ordered to 
stay in the marital home. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day ofJvne, 1999,1 caused a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument to be mailed, postage prepaid, and addressed to the following: 
Harold G. Christensen 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DATED this 2% day of June, 1999. 
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT - SLC COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLYN HAMMOND LINNELL, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




Case No: 974903252 DA 
Judge: DAVID S. YOUNG 
Date: September 21, 1999 
Clerk: uman 
HEARING 
The Court has reviewed Respondent's Motion to Amend Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decree of Divorce and Denis the same, 
This signed minute entry shall serve as the Order of the Court, 
C.C. to Counsel. 





Sep 21, 1999 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 974903252 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail HAROLD G. CHRISTENSEN 
ATTORNEY PLA 
10 EXCHANGE PLACE, 11TH 
FLOOR 
P. 0. BOX 45000 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84145 
Mail DAVID W STEFFENSEN 
ATTORNEY DEF 
2159 SO 700 E 
SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 841060000 
Dated this IP- day of Jk^ *T 19 & . 
Deputy^ourt Clerk 
Page 2 (last) 
*x*s\ 
